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JURISDICTION STATEMENT
I "his ( JOUI t has ji iris diction pursi lant to I Ital i Code \ i m. § 78-2a-3(2)
STATEMENT O F T H E ISSUES
Did the trial court apply the correct legal standard in determining whether the
Bradleys breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing?
Standard of Review: The standard of review for determining whether the trial court
applied the correct legal standard for a breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing
claims is the correction of error standard. I n, S tak • v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,, the 1 Itah Supreme
Court determined that a standard of review question is not always black and white (or
correctness vs. clearly erroneous). There is a continuum between the clearly erroneous and
cc i rectness of error standards Q\ lestions of fact (invoi\ ing events actions :>i conditions
happening, existing, or taking place) are reviewed for clear error and questions of law (rules
or principles uniformly applied to persons of similar qualities and status H. .iindar
circi instances) are reviewed for correctness. llie issue of whetb • •: •• 1"•

• - fi i; . *h:-.\ 1 he

correct legal standard in its good faith analysis is closer to a question of fact because the
scope of the duty to act in good faith is defined by common-law principles, and the terms of
in unambiguous < ontnui

bail) quesnous <»l tiw Sub|rcti\r laciiul issue- >^ h -^ ]\ir-u's

intent and expectations could be involved in the question, but are not presented in the case
at bar because the parties did not make any statements of intent regarding the amount of
discretion a ivcllci" ikb when reviewing ;i btn/m crrdil puiMi.iut 1*» thv SFA,
Issue Preserved at: K 399; TT 405:12 through 408:14.

1

2. Did the trial court err in failing to grant the Bradleys' motion for directed verdict
at the close of Plaintiffs case?
Standard of Review: The standard of review for a denial of a directed verdict is the same
for the reviewing court as it is for the trial court. Merino v. Albertsons, Inc., 975 P.2d 467, 468
(Utah 1999) (motion for directed verdict can be granted only when the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law).
Issue Preserved at: & 250:13 through 255:6
3. Did the trial court erroneously conclude that the Bradleys waived their right to
strictly enforce the Septmeber 13 financial disclosure deadline?
Standard of Review: Whether a trial court applied the correct legal standard in an
analysis of "waiver" is a pure question of law. However, the actions or events allegedly
supporting waiver are factual in nature, thus a reviewing court must grant "broadened
discretion to the trial court's [factual] findings." United Vark City Mines Co. v. Stichting
Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, % 21,140 P.3d 1200.
Issue Preserved at: & 392-398; TV 405:1-4.
4. Did the trial court erroneously conclude that the Bradleys were estopped from
strictly enforcing the September 13 deadline?
Standard of Revtiew: Estoppel is a highly fact-specific question that an appellate court
reviews under an abuse of discretion standard. State, Dept. of Human Services ex rel. Parker v.
IriZarry, 893 P.2d 1107,1108-09. (Utah 1995).
Issue Preserved at: R 392-398; I T 405:1-4.
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5. Did the trial court err in ordering specific performance? • Standard of Review: Specific performance is a discretionary ruling that a reviewing court
exam i nes i i nder an abi i se ot di scretion standard., Shields v. 1 1 irris , 934 F 2d 653, 655 (I Itah ( x.
App. 1997).
Issue Preserved at: k ^v;
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E CASE
I

Nature of the Case. This case involves the enforcement of "specific performance"

i n r elation to a Real Estate 1 *ui chase ( bntract between! )etenda nts> Appel lants Joii :i i J",
Bradley ("Mr. Bradley") and Darby G. Bradley ("Mrs. Bradley") and Plaintiffs/Appellees,
Douglas J. Markham ("Mr. Markham") and Andrea Markham aka Andrea Gasporra ("Mrs.
Markh; im").
The Bradleys were owners of on which the Bradleys had built a 3,000-square-foot log housestyle home (the "Property"). The Bradleys listed their real property located in Dammeron

was the listing agent. Ms. Carolyn Norton ("Ms. Norton"), agent for the Markhams
ultimately prepared a REPC after the Bradleys agreed to sell the Property at the price of Five
I Ii indred and Fifty Thoi :i sa ndDol lars ($550,000.00) ]\ if. Brad ley insisted that any sa k
would be partially seller-financed to allow the Bradleys to utilize certain tax advantages.
Along with the REPC, Mr. Bradley also received the Seller Financing Addendum ("SFA") to
flie RFPC ',

HOWI'TH",

l"\i. Notion did not pnoeiif fir Buyer Financial Information Shed (as

required by Section 8 of the SFA to the REPC) at that time.
On September 2,2004, the Bradleys made a written counteroffer. Ihe principal
terms oi I: he J \ B PC /u Iti mately inch ided a pi :i r chase price ot $550,000 00 wit Ii a do^\ n
3

payment of $285,000.00, earnest money to be increased to $10,000.00. Pursuant to the SFA,
the Bradleys were to finance $265,000.00 at a rate of 5.5% per annum. Ms. Norton set up a
time for the Markhams and other individuals to visit the Property on September 12,2004 to
discuss various outstanding matters and to present certain financial information that was to
be delivered by September 13. Specifically, Section 8 of the SFA required the Markhams to
present a credit report by the Seller Disclosure Deadline referred to in Section 24(b) of the
REPC (September 13, 2004).
During the September 12, 2004 meeting, Mr. Bradley appeared agitated and tired.
Although he allowed the parties to enter the home, Mr. Bradley indicated that he did not
wish to discuss any of the financial issues or review the documents presented by the
Markhams. Ms. Norton responded that the Markhams had certain financial information
(presumably the information required by Section 7 of the SFA) to present. Mr. Bradley,
responded that it was not a good time to discuss matters and did not review the documents.
Although Mr. Bradley inquired whether the discussion could be had in a "couple of weeks/'
Ms. Norton never affirmed this, nor did she prepare any writing to extend the relevant
deadlines in the REPC and SFAMs. Norton admitted at trial that her clients did not have a credit report to present on
September 12, 2004. After leaving the Property, Ms. Norton called her assistant, who
mistakenly told Ms. Norton that the Markhams had until September 30, 2004 to submit the
financial information.
On September 13, 2004, Mr. Bradley prepared and submitted to Ms. Norton by fax
the Seller's Property Disclosure information. After returning from Washington, Mrs. Bradley
drafted a letter dated September 20,2004 to Ms. Norton and informed her of their intent to
4

declare the REPC null and void due to the Markham's failure to timely provide their Credit
Report, Buyer Financial Information Sheet, and supporting documentation. After several
telephone calls and letters, the Bradleys finally received the Credit Report and financial
information on September 27, 2004.
On or about September 30, 2004, Mr. Bradley received a fax from Ms. Norton's
office forwarding a letter from Countrywide Home Loans indicating that the Markhams had
qualified for third-party financing to complete the purchase of the home.
Despite the threats of litigation, the Bradleys agreed to receive and review the
Markham's financial documents and Credit Report and discovered several items of concern
related to the Markham's credit-worthiness. The financial documents revealed that there had
been a bankruptcy and judgment in the Markhams' past. Furthermore, in reviewing the
credit report, the Bradleys discovered several delinquencies on the accounts and the amount
of credit currently being held, which gave rise to additional concerns about the Markhams'
credit-worthiness. Despite the Markhams' claims of having all the necessary documentation
with them at the meeting on September 12, 2004, the date on the Credit Report proves that
the Markhams did not request the Credit Report until September 20, 2004—eight (8) days
after the Markhams met with Mr. Bradley to provide the financial documentation as required
by the R E P C Furthermore, the actual Personal Financial Statement that was going to be
presented on September 12, 2004 was approximately one year old.
Following their review of the Markham's financial documents and Credit Report, the
Bradleys, pursuant to Section 8.1 of the SFA, and on the advice of their attorney, Robert
Jensen, canceled the REPC in a letter dated October 4,2004. Shortly thereafter, this lawsuit
was commenced with the Markhams seeking specific performance under the terms of the
5

REPC and asserting that the Bradleys breached the REPC as well as the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. The Bradleys defense was that the Markhams themselves were
estopped from asserting breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing because the Markhams had failed to fully perform their obligations under the
contract. The Bradleys also asserted that they acted in good faith and within the parameters
of discretion in canceling the REPC based upon the unsatisfactory quality and content of the
Markhams' credit report and financial information.
After a bench trial, the trial court ruled that the Bradleys had breached the REPC and
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court ordered specific
performance of the terms in the REPC and forced the Bradleys to sell the Property. The
Markahms were also awarded their attorney's fees and costs. The Bradleys filed post-trial
motions including a Rule 62 and a Rule 52(b) motion, both of which were denied.
II.

Course of Proceedings. A two-day bench trial was held on January 24 and 25,

2006. The trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [R. 267] were entered on
March 14, 2006. The Final Judgment and Order was entered April 17, 2006 [K 326]. The
Bradleys filed a Rule 62 Motion on April 27, 2006 [R 376], a Rule 59 Motion on May 1,2006
[R403], and a Rule 52(b) Motion on May, 1, 2006 [R 415]. The trial court denied the
Bradleys' post-trial motions in a Summary Ruling on Pending Motions on August 3, 2006 [R
795]. On November 2,2006, the Bradleys timely filed a Notice of Appeal. [K866J
III.

Disposition at trial court. The Markhams5 principal claim as set forth in their

complaint [R 117] was for specific performance of the terms of the REPC based upon
theories of breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court ruled that judgment
6

should be entered against the Bradleys and in favor of the Markhams for specific
performance, and that the Markhams were to be awarded their attorneys' fees and costs as
permitted by Section 17 of the REPC [K 294]. Finally, the trial court ordered that
$30,000.00 held in escrow out of the sales price of the Property to cover the cost of
removing rock and dirt and restoring the Property to its original condition. [K 283].
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Markhams became interested in the Washington County area for a second home

and possible early retirement area. [K 268].
2.

The Markhams hired real estate agents Ms. Norton and Mr. Stuart Shumway

("Shumway") to assist them in locating properties in Washington County. [R. 268].
3.

On Friday, August 27, 2004, Ms. Ms. Norton took the Markhams out to show them

the Washington area generally and, after viewing many properties, saw a "for sale" sign on
the property located at 979 North Dammeron Valley Drive. [K 269].
4.

The Markhams immediately liked the Property and asked Ms. Norton to obtain more

information about it. [K 269].
5.

By the next day (Saturday, August 28, 2004), Ms. Norton had pulled up the Multiple

Listing Service ("MLS") information for the Property and saw that it was listed with an
"owner/agent," Mrs. Bradley. [R. 269].
6.

Ms. Norton called the number for Mrs. Bradley shown in the MLS printout, and Mr.

Bradley, the co-owner, answered the phone. He stated that Mrs. Bradley was out of town,
but that he could show the Property and home and agreed to show the home that Saturday
morning. [R 269].

7

7.

On August 28, 2004, Ms. Norton and the Markhams went to the Property and met

Mr. Bradley. [K 269].
8.

While doing the walk-through, Mr. Bradley told the Markhams and Ms. Norton that

his wife was out oJ town and that all contact regarding the Property should be directed
through him and that he would pass all information and required documents on to Mrs.
Bradley. [R 269].
9.

Mr. Bradley escorted them through the house, showing them the improvements he

was making, including some remodeling of the kitchen. He stated that he was a builder and
did new home construction under the name of Pride Homes. [& 269].
10.

The Markhams spent well over an hour at the Property with Mr. Bradley. While there:
a.

Ms. Norton asked the price, to which Mr. Bradley replied that it was listed at
$650,000.00, but they were willing to take $550,000.00.

b.

Mr. Bradley pulled out a map of the Property, and showed them the
boundaries of the Property and that it was already sub-divided into three
parcels.

c.

Mr. Bradley also stated he was willing to sell some of the special-order
furniture in the home.

d.

The Markhams told Mr. Bradley that they were interested in building one or
two more homes for Mr. Markham's retiring brother and to allow his mother
to live close as well.

e.

Mr. Bradley gave Mr. Markham his business card showing his business name
and phone number. [& 270].

8

11.

While at the Property that day the Markhams developed an appreciation for the

Property and its unique characteristics. [K 270].
12.

After the first walk-through and after the Markhams returned to California. Mr.

Markham then called Mr. Bradley on or about August 30, 2004 telling him that they wanted
to buy the Property and asking what the Bradleys wanted for the Property. [K 270].
13.

The parties agreed that the Property would be sold for $550,000.00 [K 271].

14.

Mr. Bradley also stated he needed $265,000.00 down in order to buy out a partner,

and that the Bradleys could cany the balance as seller financers. [R 271].
15.

After their phone conversations, Mr. Markham called Ms. Norton to have her

prepare a written offer in the form of a Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") [Attached
hereto as Addendum " l " ] 1 consistent with the terms Mr. Bradley and Mr. Markham had
discussed. [K 271].
16.

As Mr. Markham and Ms. Norton discussed the terms of the REPC, they agreed to

include a "no prepayment penalty" and an interest rate of 5.5% on the seller-financed
amount. [K 271].
17.

The REPC prepared by Ms. Norton set forth a total purchase price of $550,000.00,

with $265,000.00 cash due at closing, while permitting seller financing of $285,000.00 at
5.5% interest on a 15-year term, requiring a $100,000.00 balloon payment at the end of the
first year, and utilizing the standard Seller Financing Addendum. It also provided for the
1

All addenda provided in support of this brief are duplicates of documents that were
submitted and accepted at trial. During trial, most of documents were submitted as "tab 1,"
"tab 2" (etc.) to Exhibit 1. Exhibit 1 ultimately included 19 documents whose admissibility
was stipulated to. For ease of reference, addenda shall merely be designated and attached in
numerical order (i.e. Addendum " 1 , " Addendum "2," etc.). Also, Addendum " 1 " contains a
duplicate copy of the REPC and SFA because the first copy is more legible, but the second
copy is countersigned.
9

parties to meet in early September to discuss remodeling issues and finalize what furniture
would stay with the house. [R 272].
18.

Ms. Norton and Shumway presented the written REPC offer to Mr. Bradley at one of

his construction job sites. Ms. Norton asked how they could contact Mrs. Bradley to present
the written REPC offer to her, and Mr. Bradley told Ms. Norton that Mrs. Bradley was in
Bellingham, Washington. [R 272].
19.

Mr. Bradley again affirmed that he would be handling the paperwork, as it was very

difficult to contact Mrs. Bradley. However, Mr. Bradley would not give Shumway or Ms.
Norton any contact information for Mrs. Bradley at that time. [R 272].
20.

Along with the REPQ Mr. Bradley also received the Seller Financing Addendum

("SFA")2 to the REPC. However, Ms. Norton did not present the Buyer Financial
Information Sheet (required by Section 8 of the SFA to the REPQ at that time.
21.

At the time Ms. Norton and Shumway presented the written REPC offer to Mr.

Bradley, Ms. Norton discussed the SFA with Mr. Bradley and the fact that they did not have
the Markhams' financial information with the offer, but would be providing it later in
whatever form the Bradleys wanted to designate. [R 272].
22.

Shortly after presenting the REPC to Mr. Bradley and after he had reviewed it with

Mrs. Bradley, Mr. Bradley presented a written counteroffer back to Ms. Norton which the
Bradleys had both signed requesting a $10,000.00 earnest money payment, increasing the
amount of down payment by another $10,000.00, and reducing the amount of the seller
financing to $265,000.00. The sales price of $550,000.00 and interest rate of 5.5%, as well as
the standard terns of the Seller Financing Addendum, remained unchanged. [R 273].
2

The SFA is attached after the REPC.
10

23.

The Markhams signed the counteroffer, and Ms. Norton called Mr. Bradley to let him

know. After the REPC was fully accepted and executed, the Markhams sent a check for the
$10,000.00 earnest money deposit, which was deposited with Century 21 at the Rockies. [R
274].
24.

Ms. Norton delivered the fully signed REPC to Mr. Bradley around September 4,

2004. At this time, Ms. Norton scheduled a follow-up meeting with Mr. Bradley for
September 12. [R 274].
25.

Ms. Norton set the date for September 12,2004 because the following day,

(September 13) was the deadline for producing financial information. Ms. Norton discussed
the need and purposes for the meeting with the Markhams as well as with Mr. Bradley, the
purposes being to go over the financial information and two of the other contingency items
listed in the REPC regarding finishing the remodeling of the home and what furniture the
Bradleys would want to sell along with the house, as well to go over house plans for the
other two homes the Markhams wanted to build on the Property. [R 274].
26.

After presenting the REPQ Ms. Norton spoke with Mr. Bradley several times about

the upcoming meeting as well as other matters. [R 274].
27.

In one of the conversations, Mr. Bradley told Ms. Norton that he wanted to extend

the closing time by at least a month, as he was having trouble finishing the remodeling and
would not be able to complete it in time, asking Ms. Norton to prepare an addendum for
him to sign. [R 274-275].
28.

In response to Mr. Bradley's desire to extend the closing deadline, Ms. Norton

received permission from the Markhams to extend the date and partially prepared an

11

addendum, telling Mr. Bradley that he would need to fill it out in full, sign it, and present it
back to the Markhams, as it would be considered a counteroffer from the Bradleys. [R. 275],
29.

During this time, prior to the September 12 meeting, there were other conversations

in person and on the phone between Ms. Norton and Mr. Bradley which were cordial. [K
275].
30.

In preparing for the September 12 meeting, Ms. Norton told the Markhams to bring

financial information with them. [R. 276].
31.

When the Markhams arrived in St. George on September 12, they first met with Ms.

Norton in her office. Mr. Markham had a briefcase from which he pulled a stack of papers
with his financial information at the top of the stack Ms, Norton saw the financial
information, although she did not review it in detail at that time. [K 276].
32.

The Markhams' financial information included three months of bank statements, a

blank financial statement from First California Bank, and a financial statement from
September, 2003. [TT 30:22 through 31:7]. [A copy of the "Personal Financial Statement
and September, 2003 financial statement that the Markhams had with them on September
12, 2004 is attached hereto as Addendum "T\
33.

During trial Ms. Norton acknowledged that Section 8 of the SFA required that the

Markhams provide a current consumer credit report by the Seller Disclosure Deadline
established in Section 24(b) of the REPC (i.e. September 13,2004). [TT 188:3-21].
34.

Although Ms. Norton had provided deposition testimony that the Markhams had a

credit report with them on September 12, Ms. Norton subsequently altered her testimony
and admitted she did not see a credit report during the Markhams visit on September 12.
[TT 216:6 through 218:14].
12

35.

Mr. Markham also confirmed that Ms. Norton did not instruct him to bring a credit

report for the meeting on September 12. [TT 72:1-15].
36.

Later in the afternoon, the Markhams then went to the Property with Ms. Norton,

Shumway and Mr. Markham's brother, Dirk Markham, and his wife, \K. 276].
37.

Arriving in the later afternoon, the Markhams found Mr. Bradley at the home in an

apparently agitated mood. [R. 276].
38.

Ms. Norton spoke to Mr. Bradley and while she was doing this, Shumway took the

Markhams to walk around the outside of the Property. Ms. Norton reminded Mr. Bradley
that they did have an appointment at this scheduled time and that it was important to go
over the financial information, the house plans, the remodeling, and the furniture issues. [K
276].
39.

Ms. Norton reminded Mr. Bradley that the Markhams were not only buying the

Property, but were looking to him as the most likely builder of the two additional homes
they wanted to build on this eight-acre parcel and that he should get control of his emotions
and proceed with the meeting they had planned. [K 276-277].
40.

Mr. Bradley acknowledged the appointment and the meeting and apologized to the

Markhams. [K 277].
41.

Inside the home, Mr. Markham set his briefcase on a table. He opened it up and took

out his stack of papers, including financial information at the top of the stack [K 277].
42.

Mr. Markham had information and records with him at that time, including the

following:
a.

A prior financial statement Mr. Markham had prepared and submitted to a
bank regarding a financial transaction unrelated to this matter, which Mr.
13

Markham was going to use to transfer updated information to a financial
statement form of the Bradleys' choice.
b.

A sample form from Mr. Markham's bank that could be completed with the
Markhams' financial information if the Bradleys decided to adopt such a form.
Additional bank records and statements from which the Markhams could
obtain any needed account information.

43.

Mr. Bradley indicated that it was not a good time to review any of the financial
information and asked if the documents could be reviewed on a different day. [K
277].

44.

The group ended up leaving after approximately 30 minutes. [K 278].

45.

While driving away Ms. Norton telephoned her assistant to confirm the date for the

submission of the financial documents to the Bradleys. Ms. Norton's assistant told her that
the deadline was September 30. [TT 186:10-18; 198:11-14].
46.

Ms. Norton testified during trial that if she would have known the submission date

was September 13, she would have "gone back in." [IT 186:13-14; 197:3-10; 198:17-21].
Ms. Norton believed that the Markhams had a "couple of weeks" to provide the Credit
Report and other financial information. [TT 152:12].
47.

Ms. Norton also said if she would have realized the correct deadline, she would have

served Mr. Bradley with the necessary financial information. [TT 222:20-22].
48.

The Markhams did not leave any of the financial information they had brought with

Ms. Norton when they returned to California on September 13 because Ms. Norton believed
they had until September 30 to submit the financial information [TT 219:16-20]; nor did the
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Markhams request that Ms. Norton obtain a credit report and deliver the credit report to the
Bradleys. [TT 87:10-25].
49.

Mr. Markham did not instruct Ms. Norton to make any further attempt to deliver the

financial documents after the September 12 meeting. [TT 97:22].
50.

Ms. Norton did not verify whether the September 13 deadline was correct, even though

she received the Seller Disclosures from the Bradleys on September 13. [TT 203:7-15;
204:14-17].
51.

Between September 13 and September 20, Ms. Norton twice stopped by one of Mr.

Bradley's construction sites and left a card, although Mr. Bradley was not present. [IT
156:2-9].
52.

Later during that week, Ms. Norton also attempted to call Mr. Bradley "once or

twice." [IT 156:11].
53.

Mr. Markham did not receive any of the alleged calls from Ms. Norton. He had

driven to Las Vegas to pick up Mrs. Bradley who had flown in on September 17. [TT 286:412].
54.

Following Mrs. Bradley's return from Washington, the Bradleys discussed their

concerns that they had not received a Credit Report or other financial documents from the
Markhams. [TT 286:13 through 287:4; 341:9-16].
55.

When the Bradleys returned to St. George on September 19, they had still not

received any financial information from the Markhams. [TT 341:3-8].
56.

On September 20, Mrs. Bradley drafted and faxed a letter indicating that the Bradleys

were canceling the REPC because the Markhams had failed to provide the required financial
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information by September 13. [K 278]. [The September 20, 2004 letter is attached hereto as
Addendum "3"].
57.

On or about September 22, Ms. Norton called Mrs. Bradley (who had returned to

Washington), and left a message. Mrs. Bradley returned the call the same day, at which time
Ms. Norton asked her what she felt it would take to make the deal work [R 279]. [Ti'
343:14].
58.

Ms. Norton asked Mrs. Bradley if the deal could be "saved" and admitted that she

thought that the Marldiams had until September 30 to "work it out." Ms. Norton stated that
she would "take the blame for that" and then stated that the Markhams "had everything"
with them September 12 (although as indicated supra, the Markhams did not have the Credit
Report ready to submit on September 12). [TT 158:13-24].
59.

Mrs. Bradley stated that she did not want to sell the Property, and that she would

only give the Markhams a right of first refusal. [TT 158:15-16].
60.

Ms. Norton explained that she had obtained the Credit Report, the updated Personal

Financial Statement and supporting documentation, and Mrs. Bradley asked Ms. Norton to
fax them over for review. [343:9-14].
61.

Ms. Norton also called Mr. Bradley. [R 279]. The conversation was not

confrontational, and Mr. Bradley simply said he could not help. [TT 159:10-14].
62.

The Markhams refused to accept the Bradleys' attempt to cancel the REPC. [R. 279].

63.

After learning of the September 20 letter, the Markhams contacted Countrywide

Home Loans ("Countrywide"). Countrywide printed a credit report and began processing a
loan application for the Property in case it was needed. [K 280].
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64.

Mr. Markham began updating the financial statement he had used for an earlier bank

loan, but, because of the rush to get the information in as quickly as possible, he was unable
to locate a blank form and had to use white-out to update the various figures on a previously
used form in order to provide current information. [K 280].
65.

On September 24, Ms. Norton prepared and faxed a letter [attached hereto as

Addendum "4"] to the Bradleys stating that the Markhams rejected the Bradleys' attempt to
cancel the REPC
66.

Ms. Norton also sent the Credit Report [attached hereto as Addendum "5"] and an

updated "Personal Financial Statement [attached hereto as Addendum "6"] with the
September 24 letter.
67.

Among other things, the September 24 letter informed the Bradleys that the

Markhams had been prequalified to fully pay the purchase price and were ready, willing, and
able to close under the REPC. [R. 280].
68.

Mr. Bradley did not receive the September 24 letter, Credit Report and updated

Personal Financial Statement until September 27. [IT 289:18-22]
69.

Mr. Bradley took the letter and information with him when he flew to Washington on

September 27 to pick Mrs. Bradley up. Mrs. Bradley reviewed the information at that time.
[TT 344:9-11].
70.

Ms. Norton (not realizing that the September 24 letter and accompanying

information had not been received by Mr. Bradley until September 27) faxed another letter
dated September 27, 2004 [attached hereto as Addendum "7"].
71.

Mr. Bradley called Ms. Norton and left a message on September 30,2004 that she

should direct all further communications to their attorney, Robert M. Jensen. By September
17

30, the Markhams had received formal notification from Countrywide that they were
approved for a loan on the Property. On September 30, Ms. Norton faxed a letter to the
Bradleys and their attorney with a copy of this notification from Countrywide. [R. 280].
[The September 30, 2004 letter is attached hereto as Addendum "8"]. [The Countrywide
notification is attached hereto as Addendum "9,yJ.
72.

The Bradleys received and reviewed all letters and the financial information. They

then met with Mr. Jensen and instructed him to send another notice to cancel the R E P C [K
281].
73.

Mr. Jensen sent a letter dated October 4, 2004 [attached hereto as Addendum "10"]

stating that his clients would not close on the REPC, claiming that the Bradleys were
excused from doing so because they had not received the financial information by
September 13. He also indicated that the financial information they received was difficult to
read and of poor fax quality, the pages seemed out of order, and that the Bradleys were
uncomfortable with a reference to a bankruptcy or judgment; therefore they were canceling
the REPC. [K 281].
74.

The Credit Report sent to and received by the Bradleys shows a credit score of 689

for Mr. Markham and 705 for Mrs. Markham. It also shows references to full on-time
payments with four instances of late payments, all four being 30 days late, two times in 2003
and two times in 2001. The reference to the bankruptcy or judgment was from reference to
Mr. Markham's filing bankruptcy approximately ten years earlier in relation to a business deal
in a shared chiropractic office. [K 281].
75.

No expert witness was called to establish whether the Markhams' credit scores were

good or poor. [R 282].
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76.

The REPC provides for the prevailing party to be awarded attorneys' fees and costs.

[R 282].
77.

Testimony at trial also established that it would cost approximately $30,000.00 to

have the dirt, rock, and debris that had been stored by the Bradleys removed from the
Property. Therefore, the trial court deemed it appropriate to hold $30,000.00 in escrow out
of the sales price of the Property to cover the cost of removing all of the rock and debris
and restoring the Property to its original condition. [K 283].
SUMMARY OF T H E ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in holding that defendants breached the duty to act in good
faith, waived and were estopped from asserting their right to rely on the September 13
deadline, and were entitled to specific performance.
The Bradleys did not breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing because they
were reasonable in refusing to loan $265,000.00 to an individual with a prior bankruptcy.
The Utah Supreme court has recently clarified its covenant of good faith jurisprudence to
ensure that the covenant is closely tied to the expectations of the parties and the plain
language of the contract from which the covenant arises. The covenant cannot create new
rights or eliminate existing rights for the contracting parties. A court may not use to
covenant of good faith to force a party to act against that party's detriment and for the
benefit of the other party.
The plain language of the SFA specifically allowed the Bradley's to review the
Markhams' financial information and cancel the REPC if they were dissatisfied in anyway
with contents of that infomiation. This language indicates that the appropriate standard to
determine whether the Bradleys acted in good faith is whether they were subjectively
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dissatisfied with the Markhams' financial information. The trial court erred when it applied
an objective reasonable standard to evaluate the Bradleys' conduct and equated the Bradleys'
tolerance for risk with that of a professional third party lender.
The Bradleys did not waive their right to rely on the Markhams' failure to submit the
required financial documents by the September 13 deadline as grounds to cancel the R E P C
Waiver requires a party to intentionally relinquish a right. For a party to waive a right, the
party must clearly and distinctly communicate waiver of that right to the other party
The actions and testimony of the parties in the present case prove that neither party
understood Mr. Bradley's actions on September 12 to waive the Bradleys' right to rely on the
September 13 deadline. The Bradleys submitted the required Seller Disclosures on
September 13, pursuant to the terms of the SFA, indicating that they did not intend to waive
reliance on that date. The Markhams' agent, Ms. Norton, indicated that she would have fully
performed on the September 13 deadline, but she mistakenly believed that the deadline was
September 30 rather than September 13. Because the actions of both parties clearly
demonstrates that neither believed that Mr. Bradley's conduct on September 12 waived the
Bradleys right to rely on the September 13 deadline, Mr. Bradley could not have intentionally
and clearly waived the right to strictly enforce the September 13 deadline.
The Bradleys should not be estopped from strictly enforcing the September 13
deadline for financial disclosures because the Markhams were not relying on Mr. Bradley's
conduct when they failed to provide the required financial documents on September 13. An
essential element of a claim for estoppel is reliance. The Markhams' agent, Ms. Norton,
testified that the reason the Markhams failed to provide the required financial information by
September 13 was because she erroneously believed the deadline was September 30.
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Undisputed testimony establishes that the Markhams were relying on their mistaken
understanding of the REPC rather than on Mr. Bradleys' conduct and the trial court

13 deadline.
I 'inally, SJAVHK p^ iiormance is not the appropriate remedy for this case because the
Markha iii s had not f i i 1 !:> performs d thei i obi igations i J ndei the R E P C
ARGUMENT
The "Trial Coun r u n
ive reasonableness1"' legal SMIKIJI il
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for breach of the c »*
air dealing because the plain
language of the R]
be subjectively dissatisfied
with the Markhams' credit an<! because i
le\s* motivations for refusing
to loan money 10 the Markhams i^ irrek van \o -,\ briber the Bradleys acted in
good faith.
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to apply an objective reasonableness standard to the REPC Second, the trial court
improperly considered the Bradley 's possible alternate e motives for cancelling the contract.
The Bradley's motivations for cancelling the contract were irrelevant to the question of

3

Appellants assert that thb issue is a legal conclusion subject to a correction of error
standard. However, il this Court: determines that the Issue is one of fact, Appellants have
marshaled evidence related to this issue in Section II of this brief.
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whether they were subjectively dissatisfied with the Markhams1 financial information, thus,
the trial court erred by introducing an irrelevant factor in its breach of good faith analysis.
A.

T h e trial court applied the wrong legal standard to determine whether
the Bradleys breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

The scope of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited by well-settled
principles. Oakmod Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101,145, 104 P.3d 1226. Courts
may not use the covenant to establish new, independent rights to which the parties did not
agree at the time they made an agreement. Id. The covenant cannot create duties inconsistent
with express contractual terms. Id. The covenant cannot force a party to exercise a right "to
its own detriment for the purpose of benefiting another party to the contract" Id. (internal
quotations omitted). Finally a court cannot use the covenant as a tool to achieve an outcome
consistent its individual notions of fairness, but inconsistent with the express terms of the
applicable contract. Id.
Generally, the covenant of good faith requires a party to refrain from acting in a way
that injures the other party's contract benefits. St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's
Hosp., 811 P.2d 194,199 (Utah 1991). Thus, to comply with the covenant of good faith a
party must act in accordance with "the agreed common purpose and the justified
expectations of the other party" Ramon v. Conover^ 2001 UT 24, % 44, 20 P.3d 876.
The case of Oakmod Village LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, 104 P.3d 1226,
illustrates that the terms of the contract and parties' course of conduct limit the scope of the
covenant of good faith. Oakmod Village involved a lease between a developer and a different
grocery store—Albertsons. Oakmod Village, 2004 UT at Tj 3. An Albertson's store closed the
store on the leased property and opened a store in a nearby location. Id. at f 5. Albertsons
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continued paying rent under the original lease. Id. at % 6. The Albertson's lease did not
contain a provision requiring Albertson's to continually operate a business on the property.
Id. at % :1 9 Instead of altering the bi isiiiess nati ire ot the lea sed location, A lbertsons
permanently closed the groceiy store on the leased property but continued to pay rent under
the lease, Albertson's relocation and closure harmed the de\: eloper's property value by
prevent! iig the de\ eloper from fi iicii rig a replacement grocery store to atti act ci istomers foi
other stores on the property. Id. at ^j 42. The developer argued that Albertson's conduer,
even if it did no; \ ^iaw me express terms of the lease, violated the covenant of good iaai.
and fair dealing by denying the developer the opportn i n ity tc attract ci istomers to its •
property Id. The I Jtah Supreme Court, noting that the covenant of good faith is limited by
:

joining comra^L, i«;ia a:» a matter wi u* -n.*. ,.^ vieveiopei iaikd to state

a claim for breach of good faith because the lease did not did no* r n. ii . "]. * * •.
continuously operate a business on the property. Id. at ff 45, 53. The court concluded that
• :-•• i u:iu,uainj w a:- .lea: unc mat ann^ugn ,\iiK,rrson s a c t i o n damage! the •. aUt;. :r.-,\

profitability of the developer's property, as a matter of law Albertson's had not breached the
covenant of good faith. Id. at ^1 n i. See also Olympus Hills Shopping Centery Ltd. v. Smith's Food
i- lhv£ Centers, ///,., 88V 1\,\| 4^> (I lull , \pp !VlHj.
The principle established in Oakwood Village is that the scope of the duty to act in
good faith is carefully tied to the terms of the contract underlying a dispute. Where there is
lie contr actual provision requiring a d\ it) , a court wil I n :>t i e v\ rite the contract in favor of the
complaining party.
In the instant case, the trial court .improperly expanded the covenant of good faith to
eliminate the Brae •

:u< ; ..: - .n

h]i\i uu Aiarui.im 's credit. fhe court used the
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covenant of good faith as a tool to achieve an outcome consistent with its own notions of
fairness but inconsistent with the terms of the contract.
Section 8.1 of the seller finance addendum to the REPC grants the Bradleys wide
latitude to review and reject the Markhams' credit:
If the content of the credit report or the Buyer Disclosures is not acceptable
to Seller, Seller may elect to either: (a) provide written objections to Buyer as
provided [elsewhere in the contract]; or (b) immediately cancel the REPC by
providing written notice to Buyer.... [Addendum "1"].
This provision of the SFA does not specify any standard by which the Seller may assess
the Buyer's credit. To the contrary, it grants complete discretion to the Seller. Importantly,
the provision does not require the credit information to satisfy a third party lender or a
hypothetical, objective reasonableness standard. It requires only that the credit information
satisfy the Seller (the Bradleys). The trial court ignored this broad discretion and imposed an
exacting scrutiny on the Bradleys' decision to reject the Markhams' credit. The proper legal
standard for the trial court was whether the Bradleys were subjectively satisfied with the
Markham's credit, not whether a reasonable third party lender would have been satisfied
with the Markham's credit.
The trial court noted that the Markhams qualified for a loan through a professional
third party lending company (Countrywide). Based upon this qualification, the trial court
concluded that it was objectively unreasonable for the Bradleys to cancel the REPC even
though the Markhams' financial information included a prior bankruptcy judgment, a tax
lien, numerous late payments, and was in sloppy condition. [K 288-290]. The trial court did
acknowledge that there was a bankruptcy judgment against the Markhams, but because
Countrywide would have loaned money to the Markhams, it decided that the Bradleys
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should have felt secure in financing $265,000.00 to individuals w h o had previously filed for
bankruptcy B\ Uoseh scrutinizing the Bradleys' decision to not loan money to the
M.irkh.mv, -ind comparing then dn isiou in ih it nl ,I ilmul |uttv lender, tin in.il mini
expanded the scope of the covenant of good faith beyond the terms of the SFA and the
expectations of the parties.
The plain language of \<vn
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subjective judgment in. determining whether to extend credit to the Markhams. Conversely,
the trial court purported i.. lu.,,; \\^ iMadim-. h> an "i^jccuvc

standard, but based its ruliilg

on its o w n subjective reasoning. It granted no deference to the Brae Hey sy legiti mate reasons
for refusing to extend credit to the .Markhams and replaced their reasonable decision with its
o * 11,' I Ih is v iolated the express pro visions oi the contract ^.,. me expectations of the partres.
The trial court compares the Bradleys—who had never previously financed a real
estate transaction

i< * Oxintrywide—-an established, experienced, professional lender. This

i :i nfairl} pitted ti- l*-\v:^ ;5 5 toiei ance for :i *i sk again si: that of a professional lender vv itii years
of experience, Countrywide has been in the financial industry since 1969 (nearh 4C

-: )

and is a publicly traded company The Bradleys, on. the other hand, have comparatively little

regularly reviewed his own credit report, but has no other experience reviewing credit
.reports. [Tl 308:20-309:7]. At trial, he could recall the name of two out of the three major
credit reporting companies [TI '31 0:1 25] I fe also did not clear i) understand Mi
Markham's credit report. [ I T 325:10-25 (testifying that he did not understand basic elements
of Mr. Markham's credit report)]. Although purporting to evaluate the rationality'of the
.1 iradley s review of the Markhams' cred it information i inder an objective reasonableness
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standard, the court imposed a reasonable professional lender's experience as the standard.
The professional and corporate entity status of Countiywide makes its tolerance for
risks and scrutiny when lending very different from the financial and emotional risks
involved when an individual or family decides to lend money The Bradleys risk their own
personal wealth and livelihood by lending money unlike Countrywide which is structured to
absorb such risks.
The plaintiffs do not deny the negative facts in their financial and credit information.
The prior bankruptcy, tax lien, late payments, and sloppy condition of the Markhams'
financial information are enough to justify the Bradleys' decision to not loan the Markhams
$265,000. The trial court ignored these facts and used the covenant of good faith to reach a
result consistent with its own notions of fairness, but inconsistent with the terms of the
contract.
The trial court also ruled that the Bradleys' concerns over the sloppiness and poor
quality of the Markham's financial information elevated form over substance. This
conclusion fails to consider that the Markhams' late, hastily assembled, sloppy, handwritten
financial information indicates a pattern of disorganization that creates an emotional stress
for the Bradley's. A professional third party lender such as Countrywide has employees who
are trained and prepared to deal with late payments, non-standard reporting forms, and
disorganized financials. The Bradleys could not reasonably hire an employee to handle such
administrative challenges throughout the life of the loan and would be compelled to deal
with the Markham's on a personal and intimate level on a monthly basis if they personally
financed the home. Accordingly, the Bradleys were legitimately concerned these problems
might continue or become worse through the life of the loan if they decided to proceed with
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financing. Such emotional stress and conflict might be imm.ate.rial for Countrywide '"who
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concern for the Bradleys.
The trial court mistakenly relies on the Markhams' being "pre-qualified" for a loan

executed ^ r that run* MUII in the pre-qualification letter will become m o n e y in the b a n k As
such, neither the mai court, n o r the Bradleys should have relied, o n such preliminary
,:i :o formation as a basis t o evaluate the credit ol the Markhams
Further, the trial court's decision to specifically enforce 'the R E P C forced the
wi auk ^ to act against their best interests and assume the risk of loaning m o n e y to the
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the benefit of the Alarkliains.
i in* case is similar t o ( )JKWOOCI i iliage where the court dismissed uie ciaiiu lor breach
of good, faith heca/i ise !'\ Lbertson's condi ict \K a s w ith i n the scope of appropriate action
defined by the contract. Like Albertson's lease in Oakwood I 'iliage which contained no
provision u www niuiLaia; a hiw,,,, udty to act in the leaseholder^ best interest, there is no
duty lis ted in the REPCorSFA , here, wh ich woi ;i Id implicate abi oadduty tc > o verk o k the
negative aspects of the Markhams" credit to save the contract. Thus, as a matter of law, the
scope of the Bradleys' duty to act in good faith did not require them to act in a manner
consistent with that of a professional lendei or to take on a cred it risk w h e n the R E I *C
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allowed them discretion to review and reject the Markhams credit history.
Defendants had a right to exercise discretion and the trial court improperly replaced
that right and discretion with its own judgment. This court should reverse the trial court's
determination that an objective reasonableness standard was the appropriate legal standard
to determine whether the Bradleys' breached the covenant of good faith.
B.

T h e Bradleys' motivation for canceling the contract is irrelevant to
whether they acted in good faith because dissatisfaction with the
Markhams' credit information alone justified cancellation of the REPC.

In contract law, the requirement that a person exercise discretion in good faith
generally does not refer to a person's motivations for acting, but to the rationality,
reasonableness, fairness, or propriety of the person's actions under the terms of the contract
and in light of the parties' expectations. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. a.
If a party acts rationally and pursuant to the contract terms, the party's motivations for
taking action are irrelevant. It is enough that the person acted according to the terms of the
contract.
A hypothetical scenario illustrates the forgoing principle: a seller contracts to convey
property to a buyer. The seller agrees to finance the transaction and includes a seller
financing addendum to the contract with a seller review clause identical to the clause in the
present case. The price of the land increases dramatically between the time the parties signed
the sales contract and the financial disclosure deadline. The seller will have obvious
motivation to cancel the contract and the buyer will have obvious motivation to enforce the
contract. The buyer makes his financial disclosures and turns out to have the worst possible
credit. Elated, the seller cancels the contract and provides written notice to the buyer
pursuant to the contract.
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Tn ihe hypothetical, the seller was partially motivated to cancel the contract for
reasons cmci man UK inn LT s poor credit, hm the seJici did not exercise their discretion in
bad faith. The buyer's poor credit was .v it diTiemlei
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seller breached the covenant of good faith and any alternative motivations lor cane* linj;; t h<*
contract are irrelevant.
In the present case, the coi :i :i I: foi J nd that the Bi adlej s cancelled the contract because
they wanted to back out of the sale and used the Markham's credit as pretext to disguise a
desire to renege o n the R E P C As illustrated by the hypothetical above, the Bradleys'
motivations for canceling the contract shoi :i lei not i: ela te to the c o v eiiaiit of good faith.
Rather, the sole consideration should be whether the negative elements of the Markhams'
financial information justified the Bradleys' decision to cancel the contract. Even if the
Bradleys were partial [y motivated to cancel the contract f 01 reasons other than the
Markham's credit, the contract gave them discretion to accept or reject the Markhams' credit
iniormation aitd n iliey acted rationally, they did not breach 'the covenant of good faith. The
l! I ;il M nil f \ ron< lush >n (hit! ihc liiadln s used the Markhams' i rah l ;^ prelect (o Liiim I I In
contract is not sufficient to support its conclusion that the Bradleys acted in bad faith given
the undisputed and material negative facts relating to the Markhams' credit.
riie trial court erred by fail my in
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The appellate court reviews the evidence, drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Id. When challenging a denial of a directed verdict, a
party is required to "marshal the evidence" and demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient
when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict. When reviewing a motion for a new
trial the reviewing court uses an abuse of discretion standard. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817
P.2d 789, 804 (Utah 1991).
Drawing conclusions and inferences from the above-stated evidence in favor of the
verdict, the evidence is nonetheless insufficient to support a verdict for a breach of the
covenant of good faith. Thus, even if the trial court used the appropriate standard for
evaluating the Bradleys' decision to cancel the contract, reasonable minds could not disagree
that the Bradleys breached the covenant of good faith.
Marshaled Evidence
'"Whether the implied covenant of good faith performance was breached.. .is a factintensive inquiry, ordinarily left for the fact-finder." Pugh v. North American Warranty Services,
Inc., 2000 UT App. 121,1f 23,1 P.3d 570.
To successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal, "[a]n appellant
must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be "against the clear weight
of the evidence." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted)
(alteration in original). See also West Valley City v. Majesticlnv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah
Ct.App.1991).
The trial court found that it "was unreasonable for the Bradleys to reject the
Markhams" credit worthiness based on the documents presented to them. The Bradleys did
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not rely on credit worthiness issues. Rather, their "evaluation" was a pretext, to cancel the
Kiil'i because they had already changed their minds about selling. Tins was in brcach of the
implied covenant of"*>. >.». * 1 mt 1 • -;..--r
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In rejecting Air. Bradley testified that he expected the credit report to be from iCExperiany" one oj the
three majo? credit reporting agencies, and not the iCLandsafe" company shown on the front oj the
credit report, yet while on the witness stand, Mr. Bradley acknowledged that the credit report did
show the Experian credit score on both of the Markhams and that the credit information was
gathered fro!,. ]yxpcnan.
•••

Mr. Bradir iesii*W
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was from "Landsafe" (see Addendum "5", hereto with the language "Landsafe
M U . ; . — -V> iu;>>.:; ,n *<^ ; >\>, and not one oi 11ic three major credit
repo^me a;:rnnV-; (like F.v.nmir'

\\ ; h'.

-

••

*. I . ^.;

,^MIII,;
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XPN, TUC and EXF were listed on the Credit. Report:. Mr. Bradley stated he
(IKI noi know what those acronyms stood i^. -iu ^ ,K u anally reviewed the
Credit Report. [TT 309:8 through 312:1 2].,
(2)

The Markhams' credit scores of 689 and 705 were sufficient for Countrywide to qualify the
*/,//A//^"/.»

/</ * '. a, ;oi iiiic, iw amount that the Bradleys agreed to finance. I conclude that it

would not be objectively reasonable for the Bradleys to claim this as , / "mnvd to ,; wcel ///< * K \ i IV
See Addendum " 5 " (Credit Report) and Addendum 9 (Countrywide Letter).
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The Bradley's both testified that one of the most important elements in their decision to reject the
financial information was that it was handwritten on the form and looked sloppy and that they
would not present such a sloppy form to anyone in seeking credit for themselves, yet they testified that
they had no objection to the information on the report showing the Markhams' monthly income or
their net worth or their credit scores. I conclude that this objection to the form or appearance of the
Markhams' papers had nothing to do with the merits of the information provided to them, so that it
was objectively unreasonable for the Bradleys to reject the Markhams'financial information on this
basis.
•

Mr. Bradley testified that the poor quality of the Credit Report bothered him.
[TT 312:20 through 313:3].

•

Mrs. Bradley testified that the poor quality of the Credit Report bothered her.
[TT 345:6-19].

•

Mrs. Bradley specifically noted that the substantive contents of the Credit
Report and the failure to timely deliver required documents were concerning.
[TV 344:22 through 345:19].
The Bradleys also testified that they had a concern as to whether the Markhams could meet a

monthly payment obligation if they could not meet the REPC deadline to furnish the financial
information, yet the Markhams had shown the Bradleys that the Bradleys would not need to carry
the note for any extendedperiod of time, as the Markhams had lined up Countrywide to immediately
pay off the seller financing, completely eliminating that claimed concern.
•

See Addendum " 5 " (Credit Report) and Addendum " 9 " (Countrywide Letter).
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•

Mrs, Bradley expressed concern as to whether the \'!.irkh,i 11 - .\ • !-. -

) ke

monthly payments given the failure to timely submit essential documents. [TT
34 I,1- IS,
•

UIJ.I

IV>b2.ll li»|.

•

]\ Ir Brad le) expressed concern as to whether the Markham s wou id ma ke
monthly payments given the failure to timel) submit essential documents. [I T
290:14 22; 292:2. 11; 293:13 18].
' The credit report show. s only four historical delinquencie r, all k /;< un:\ >^-<ij, delinauet. •

two of them showing the last delinquency date in 2003 and two of them showing the last delinquency
date in 2001 \ which is a very small and insignificant number of delinquencies in comparison to the
many timely payments.
•

See Addendum " 5 " (Credit Report).

In the "Notice of Cancellation" from their attorney, the Bradleysy only specific comment on the merits
of the Mark ha/i'\ .7 ,/// iwn'- "...»

>>•• ,uu,.\ .v> • -- t//\n/p/t) m ///ug/uen,,'" 'The

evidence established that Countrywide did not consider this ten or twelve-year old bankruptcy to
disqualify the Markhams from a loan for twice the amount that the Bradleys agreed to finance.
1 furthermore, \4.rs B; ; id ley J broker testified that she nt we} in*. mtioned a banki uptcy to him until just
before their depositions were taken. I conclude that it was not objectively reasonable for the Bradleys
to claim this as aground to cancel the REPC support of its finding of waiver.
' • '

Sit

\ i ••

.

•»•-

.

ivjiiv! i r o i u .•:.

.V:JSC:I

•

See Addendi HTI "9." (Coi intry wide I ett er).

•

Mr. Roger Hamlin testified that Mrs, Bradley was initially concerned
about the untimely delivery ol the iinancial documents, and
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subsequently raised her concern about the issue of bankruptcy. [TT
361:8 through 364:7].
T h e Trial Court's Conclusion was Against the Cleat Weight of the Evidence,
There is no precise standard that defines the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
("covenant of good faith" or "covenant"). The covenant is a flexible concept that is has
sometimes been used inconsistently. See Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, f 40, 94
P.3d 193 (Nehring J. concurring). Recently however, the Utah Supreme Court has
consistently limited the scope of the covenant of good faith to the express terms of the
contract and expectations of the parties. Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions, 2003 UT 57, \ 20,
84 P.3d 1154 ("the degree to which a party to a contract may invoke the protections of the
covenant turns on the extent to which the contracting parties have defined their expectations
and imposed limitations on contract terms."). Section 205 of the Restatement of Contracts
notes that "good faith performance of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed
common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party," and
that a breach of good faith contradicts "community standards of decency, fairness, and
reasonableness."
Applying these legal principles to the marshaled facts, a reasonable person could not
disagree that the Bradleys' decision to cancel the REPC, based on legitimate concerns over
the Markham's financial information, was undertaken in good faith. The single fact that the
Markhams had a bankruptcy on their credit justifies the Bradley's decision to cancel the
R E P C At trial, the Markhams testified that the bankruptcy was remote and unrelated to
their present credit situation, but never testified that they communicated this information to
the Bradleys. The Bradleys based their decision purely on the contents of the Markhams'
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financial documents. It is obvious that a person who has gone through bankruptcy presents
a significant credit risk As previously noted, this risk implicated the Bradleys' own personal
assets i athertha n those of a corporate entit) ; B) lendi ng money to the A larkhams, the
Bradleys risked their quality of lite and financial solvency Because the presence of a
bankruptcy judgment alone on the Markhams credit justifies the Bradleys' decision to cancel
the R EPC tl ie coi it: t si 101 ilcl ha\ e grante d the 1 irad leys'' motion for a di rected \ erdict.
Additionally the fact that the Bradleys obtained an objective opinion from a licensed
attorney familial with contractual duties and obligations prior to canceling the REPC
* • - h e SF i\ \ d \ ice of <

demonstrates good faith action t :i iiclc -• -

.>

: at "s

that the Bradleys' actions were rational An experienced, disinterested third ™?rv advised the
liiadicvs iudi Liic bankruptcy, tax lien, late payments, and other negative laciuai informaiion

attorney's expertise when deciding to cancel the contract. They were not acting from
improper motivations when they canceled the REPQ they were relying on an experienced
attorney s objecth e legal advice
The fact that the Bradleys reviewed the Markham's credit information even after'the
Markhams' missed the required contract deadlines indicates the Bradleys' good faith action.
1 )nrl>y noli tied flic Marl! KUI is < »f thv B radio 'S intent to ram el the KTPi ' based i >u I IK
Markhams5 failure to provide the required financial disclosures at the appropriate deadlines.
Upon .receiving this notification, the Markhams attempted to contact; Darby, and when she
i:eti lrned thei i: cal I, she agreed to rev iew the Mark hams cred it information despite it bei ng
late. Mrs. Bradley was not required to review then* credit, but nonetheless reviewed the
Markhams' credit and paid an attorney to help the Bradleys evaluate the Markhams5 credit.
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The Bradlevs' willingness to review the Markhams' financial information indicates good faith
performance under the contract.
Apart from the bankruptcy there are many other undisputed, negative elements of
the Markhams' credit information that justified the Bradley's decision to not loan the
Markhams $265,000. There are various late payments reflected in the Markhams' financial
information. Importantly, the late payments were quite recent, indicating possible problems
with the Markham's current financial situation. There was also a tax lien on the report. Mr.
Markham testified that he had the tax lien removed, but never mentioned this fact to the
Bradleys. Although Mr. Markham was always very confident about his credit when speaking
to the Bradleys and the Bradleys were careful to closely scrutinize the substance of the
Markham's credit rather than taking Mr. Markhams' word at face value.
Finally, the late, disorganized, handwritten, and heavily revised condition of the
financial information tends to confirm the Bradley's suspicion that the Markhams' presented
a credit risk The unofficial and untrustworthy nature of Mr. Markham's hand-written
documents appeared to confirm the Bradleys' suspicions that the Markhams' were
irresponsible with their credit. It would not be unreasonable to conclude that the whited-out
and handwritten portions of the Markham's financial information were flat-out dishonest. If
not dishonest, the informal aspect of the documents certainly supports the Bradleys'
conclusion that the Markhams maintained a similarly informal attitude toward full and timely
payments.
In sum, the undisputed evidence presented by the Markhams squarely supports the
Bradley's reluctance to loan money to the Markhams. Although a person with a high
tolerance for risk might agree to personally loan $265,000.00 to a buyer with a prior
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bankruptcy, tax lien, and recent late payments appearing on decidedly late and informal
financial documents, it would certainly be more reasonable to seek a less risky opportunity

in this case because the Markhams5 financial information was informally presented,
contained a bankruptcy judgment, a tax lien, and evidence of recent late payments.
- i.v. Bradleys did inof w uivr llinn rnjlil In sliirlh, rnlnn v llur Scpinnbn i ( \ .
aeadline.
To establish waiver, a part)7" must show: (1) an existing right, (2) knowledge of its
existence, and (3) i i •• • • •

•- •

;r ; n ; m , -MC* :• IL.

;. ; hwcra rca. ,)ar. c~ L^J/; L , ny

357 P.2d 935, 940 (Utah 1993). Each element of the test must be met in order for there to
be an effective waiver. Whether a trial court: applied the correct legal standard in an analysis
(

"'

.

• .

. • I: lowevri, i:. <u . •;

*..ii anege uly supporting

waiver are facti tal in nature, thus a reviewing court must grant "broadened discretion to the
trial court's [factual] findings/5 Urn fed Park City Mines Co. v. S tichtingMajflower Mountain Vonds^
20061 IT 35, f 21 1,4 01 • 3d 1 200,
When the element of intent is determinative, the appellants must marshal all
evidence .in support of that finding. I Jnited Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain
hmui\\ 2U0h i IT V\\

?.•>, i III V \A i ">()(l When < I in I longing a liial u»utt"s huttings oi fact,

[a]n appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking
in support as to be "against the clear weight of the evidence/ thus making
them'clearly erroneous;' In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1 W
The first two elements of waiver—the existence of a right and knowledge of its
existence—are rarely controverted and easily understood. As long as the party actually had
the right, and knew they possessed the right, the first t v\< o elements are met. f ) nited Park City
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Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, f 23, 140 R3d 1200 (Utah 2006).
Litigation most often arises in relation to the third element—intent to relinquish the
right. When deciding whether a party intended to relinquish a right, the fact finder should
"assess the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the relinquishment is clearly
intended." Soter'slnc. v. DeseretFed. Sap. <&LoanAss% 857 P.2d 935, 941 (Utah 1993).
However, intent to relinquish must be distinct and "will not be implied from doubtful acts."
Jensen v IRC Hospitals Inc., 2003 UT 51, \ 84, 82 P.3d 1076. The Utah Supreme Court has
held that "any waiver must be distinctly made, although it may be express or implied." Soter's
Inc. v. DeseretFed. Sav. &LoanAss%

857 P.2d 935, 940 (Utah 1993) (internal citations

omitted). By requiring a distinct manifestation of intent the Utah Supreme Court "ensure[d]
that waiver would not be found from any particular set of facts unless it was clearly
intended." Soterslnc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. &LoanAss'n,

857 P.2d 935, 940 (Utah 1993).

Marshalled Evidence
To successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal, "[a]n appellant
must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be "against the clear weight
of the evidence." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted)
(alteration in original). See also West Valley City v. Majesticlnv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah
Ct.App.1991) ("[I]he challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the
appellant resists."). As already noted, the first two elements of waiver (the existence of a
right and the knowledge of its existence) are not at issue. However, the third element of
waiver, "intent to relinquish the right" is fact-sensitive and requires the challenging party to
38

marshal all evidence from the record in support of the trial court's finding of such "intent."
It is somewhat problematic that in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the
trial court does not specifically analyze and apply the three elements of waiver to the facts.
The trial court only generally identifies underlying facts on which it found a waiver of the
Bradley's rights to reply on the September 13 deadline, namely: (1) the Markhams, through
Ms. Norton, set up a September 12 meeting with Mr. Bradley to discuss their financial
information, (2) Mr. Bradley was aware of the meeting and its purpose and had lead the
Markhams and Norton to believe that he was the only contact person for the sellers, (3) Mr.
Bradley did meet briefly with the Markhams and Ms. Norton on September 12, but when
Mr. Markham tried to present the financial paperwork, Mr. Bradley refused to take the
documents and asked if the documents could be reviewed at a later time, and (4) despite
being the listing agent, for Property, Mrs. Bradley had never made herself available to discuss
anything about the REPC prior the deadline. [K 285]
The trial court never explains how these facts are tantamount to a "relinquishment"
of their right to strict enforce the September 13 deadline for production of the Gredit Report
(which was the only document required by the September 13 deadline—a document the
Markhams admit they did not have on September 12). Notwithstanding this lack of clarity,
the Bradleys have marshaled the evidence for each of the four enumerated facts cited by the
trial court in support of its finding of waiver.
(1)

the Markhams, through their agent, set up a September 12 meeting with Mr. Bradley to discuss
their financial information;

•

Mr. Markham testified that Ms. Norton set the meeting for September 12, in
order to meet certain deadlines. [TT 28:22 through 29:1].
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•

Ms. Norton testified that she arranged for the September 12 meeting to
present financial information. [TT 137:3-16; 139:4-25; 142:2-9; TT 189:20].

•

Mr. Bradley testified that a meeting was set up for September 12. [TT 281:11].

Mr. Bradley was aware of the meeting and its purpose and had lead the Markhams and Norton to
believe that he was the only contactperson for the sellers;

•

See preceding cites.

•

Ms. Norton testified that Mr. Bradley was the contact person for sellers and
that Mr. Bradley notified Ms. Norton that Mrs. Bradley was out of the state
and that he would be handling the transfer of relevant documents. [TT 116:12
through 119:10; 144:15-24; TT 185:14].

•

Mr. Bradley testified that he was the contact person for sellers and that Mrs.
Bradley was out of the state and that he would be handling the transfer of
relevant documents. [TT 281:13-18].

Mr. Bradley did meet briefly with the Markhams and Ms. Norton on September 12, but when Mr.
Markham tried to present the financialpaperwork, Mr Bradley refused to take the documents and
asked if the documents could be reviewed at a later time;

•

Mr. Markham testified that the meeting was held on September 12 and that
Mr. Bradley refused to take the documents and asked to review the documents
later. [TT 35:16 through 40:25].

•

Ms. Norton testified that the meeting was held on September 12 and that Mr.
Bradley refused to take the documents and asked to review the documents
later. [TT 148:22 through 152:7; 192:10 through 193:4; 196:17-19].
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•

Mr. Bradley testified that the meeting was held on September 12 and that he
refused to take the documents and asked to review the documents later. [TT
282:12 through 285:7].

(4)

despite being the listing agent, for Property, Mrs. Bradlej had never made herself available to discuss
anything about the REPCprior to the deadline.

•

Mrs. Bradley testified that she was in Washington prior to the September 13
deadline and that Mr. Bradley was directly handling the transaction, although
communicating with her. [TV 332:14 through 335:12; 336:3 through 337:11;
339:12 through 340:17].

•

Ms. Norton testified that prior to the September 13 deadline, she was unable
to contact Mrs. Bradley and worked directly with Mr. Bradley pursuant to his
instructions. [TT 115:15 through 119:10; 123:5-19; 144:15 through 145:22].

•

Mr. Bradley testified that he was the contact person for sellers and that Mrs.
Bradley was out of the state and that he would be handling the transfer of
relevant documents. [TT 281:13-18].

Additionally, the trial court noted that because Mr. Bradley was angry and because he
wanted additional time to review the documents, it was "appropriate and reasonable for the
Markhams not to provide any financial information, including a credit report, until such time
as the new meeting was set." \R. 286]. According to the trial court, it would have been
"futile" for the Markhams or Ms. Norton to try and present their financial information on
Monday, September 13. The trial court also noted that "the Bradleys had accepted the
REPC and [SFA] without a Buyer Financial Information Sheet, thereby waiving the right to
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receive financial information in that particular form." [R. 286]
(5)

Mr. Bradley was angry and wanted additional time to review the documents;

•

Ms. Norton testified that Mr. Bradley was initially upset when they arrived on
September 12. [R 148:10 through 149:12].

•

Mr. Bradley testified that he was agitated when the Markhams and Ms. Norton
arrived on September 12. [R 283:3; 284:9; 285:1]

•

Mr. Markham testified that Mr. Bradley was initially upset when they arrived
on September 12. [R 36:12 through 37:16; 78:18-24].

•

Ms. Norton testified that Mr. Bradley asked to review the documents at a later
time. [R 150:19-21; 152:6-16].

(6)

the Bradleys had accepted the REPC and SFA without a Buyer Financial Information Sheets

•

Ms. Norton testified that Mr. Bradley accepted the REPC and SFA without a
Buyer Financial Information Sheet. [R 134:11 through 135:21].

Applying these principles to the present case, it is clear that Mr. Bradley did not waive
his right to enforce the September 13 deadline when he requested the parties meet at a later
date. The Bradleys do not dispute that they knew they had a right to enforce the September
13 deadline for the Credit Report. [See Addendum "1"]. The Bradleys both signed the REPC
and knew its contents. However, the trial court incorrectly found that they had intentionally
waived their right to strictly enforce the deadline. [K285]. Undisputed facts establish that
both parties performed on the contract as if there was not waiver.
The Bradleys did not believe the Mr. Bradley's actions waived their right to rely on
the September 13 deadline. After the September 12 meeting, the Bradleys were acting under
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the assumption that the deadline was still in effect because they faxed the Section 7 Sellers
Disclosures to the Markhams on September 13. [See Addendum "14"]. If the Bradleys had
waived the deadline, it is unlikely that they would have been concerned about delivering the
required disclosures to the Markhams by the September 13 deadline.
The trial court also ignored the statute offrauds[see Utah Code Ann. 25-5-1 etseq.
(1953)] and the fact that Section 14 of the REPC specifically prohibits oral modification of
its terms in finding that Mr. Bradley orally waived the timely presentation of the Buyer
Financial Information Sheet (which should have been submitted concurrently with the SFA).
Furthermore, Ms. Norton did not understand Mr. Bradley's actions to waive his right
to rely on the September 13 deadline. At trial she insisted that she would have returned to
the house to leave the financials with Mr. Bradley if she would have known the deadline was
September 13. However, Ms. Norton's assistant mistakenly informed her that the deadline
for the credit report was September 30. The Markhams failed to deliver the required Credit
Report not because of Mr. Bradley's actions, but because of Ms. Norton's own mistake.
Mr. Bradley performed his part of the contract by sending out the Seller Disclosure
Documents on September 13. Ms. Norton testified that she would have left the financial
disclosure information with the Mr. Bradley if her assistant had not made the error. As a
matter of law there could be no distinct, intentional waiver when uncontested evidence
shows that neither party behaved in a manner consistent with waiver.
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IV.

The Bradleys are not estopped from strictly enforcing the Seller Disclosure
Deadline as a result of Mr. Bradley's actions because there was no reasonable
reliance by the Markhams.

T h e trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the Bradleys were estopped
from strictly enforcing the September 13 deadline.
Estoppel is a highly fact-specific question that an appellate court reviews under an
abuse of discretion standard. State, Dept. of Human Services ex rel Parker v. Iri^arry, 893 P.2d
1107,1108-09. (Utah 1995).
There are three elements to a claim for Estoppel:
"(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with
a later-asserted claim; (2) the other party's reasonable action or inaction based
upon the first party's statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injuiy
to the second party that would result from allowing the first party to
contradict or repudiate its statement, admission, act, or failure to act." Brixen v.
Elton, 777 P.2d 1039,1043-44 (Ut. App. 1989).
To meet the first element of an equitable estoppel claim, the party seeking to
establish estoppel must to show that the other party "made a statement or admission, or that
it acted in a manner inconsistent with its right to enforce the forfeiture provision of the
parties' written lease agreement/5 IHC Health Services, Inc. v. D <& K Management, Inc., 2003 UT
5 Tfll, 73 P.3d 320. The second element of estoppel is reasonable reliance. When relying on
the statement of a party "it is not enough that the person who heard [the representations]
deemed that he was warranted in acting as he did; the language used ought of itself to
furnish the warrant." Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 4 Utah 2d 155,
159, 289 P.2d 1045 (1955) (internal citations omitted). The third element of estoppel is
whether the relying party would be harmed if the first party retracted its statement or act.
I^arry, 893 P.2d at 1108-09.
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Marshaled Evidence
To successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal, "|a]n appellant
must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be "against the clear weight
of the evidence." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted)
(alteration in original). See also West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah
Ct.App.1991) ("[Tjhe challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the
appellant resists."). Although there is not a strict marshalling requirement in appealing a
finding of estoppel, the Bradleys have marshaled the evidence in challenging the finding of
estoppel because estoppel is "highly fact specific" question.
As with its analysis of the "waiver" doctrine, the trial court does not analyze and apply
the three elements of estoppel in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. If anything,
the trial court says even less about estoppel, only briefly noting that "[d]ue to Mr. Bradley's
refusal to talk about the issue and Mrs. Bradley's refusal to make herself available, the
Bradleys are estopped to rely on the September 13 deadline...." [R.285]. This brief mention
of estoppel is apparently conflated with the more broad discussion of waiver. Accordingly,
the Bradleys respectfully direct this Court to the marshaled evidence presented in the
preceding Argument section of this brief relating to "waiver."
The trial court's estoppel analysis is incorrect for two reasons. First under the plain
language of the contract, the Markhams failed to present their financial information at the
time they executed the SFA Second, Mr. Bradley's statement was not inconsistent with his
later actions and even if it was, undisputed testimony establishes that neither the Markhams
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nor their agent, Ms. Norton, relied on Mr. Bradley's statements. They explicitly stated that
they failed to meet the September 13 deadline because they were relying on Ms. Norton's
mistaken belief that the deadline was September 30.
The trial court held that "the Bradleys are estopped to rely on the September 13
deadline; it would be inequitable to allow the Bradleys to take advantage of their own
obstructive and misleading conduct." [R.285]. The Bradleys should not have been estopped
from holding the Markhams to the Seller Disclosure Deadline because Mr. Bradley's
statements and behavior on the September 12 meeting were not inconsistent with his later
behavior and Ms. Norton was not relying on his actions when she failed to produce the
financial documents.
The elements of estoppel are clearly defined but the trial court did not apply any test
let alone analyze the appropriate elements or correctly apply the three factor test. The trial
court relied on a misconception that the Bradleys made themselves totally unavailable which,
in turn, made it impossible for the Markhams to comply with the deadline. [K 285]. Mr.
Bradley's statement that he did not want to review the financial information on the
September 12 did not relate to or refer to the deadline on September 13 because he still
faxed to Ms. Norton his Seller Disclosure Documents as required by the REPC. [See
Addendum "14"].
Even if, under the first element, Mr. Bradley's conduct on September 12 was
inconsistent with his later acts, the trial court erred because the Markhams and Ms. Norton
undisputedly did not rely on his behavior. Ms. Norton admits in her testimony that she
called her assistant who told her that the Seller Disclosure Deadline was not until September
30. Ms. Norton further testified that if she would have known the deadline was on
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September 13, she would have returned to the house and left the financial documents with
Mr. Bradley on the 12th. [TT 197:4 through 198:25]. Neither Ms. Norton nor the Markhams
relied on his conduct. They relied on their own mistaken information. [Id.; TT 64:3-8
(Douglas Markham testifying that he understood that the 13th was the deadline for the
financial disclosures)].
The Markhams would not be harmed by allowing Mr. Bradley to repudiate his
statement or act because there is no inconsistency with his later actions. However, if Mr.
Bradleys' actions were inconsistent and the Markhams relied on such inconsistency (which
they did not), the Markhams only injury would be two trips to St. George. They would still
have had the opportunity to find new property as it had only been twenty-three days (August
28 to September 20) since they first saw the Bradleys5 property. [R. 269; 278 ]. The Bradleys
should not be estopped from enforcing the Seller Disclosure Deadline as the facts do not
show a statement in conflict with later actions, no reliance on the Bradleys' allegedly
inconsistent conduct, and no injury to the Markhams as a result of Mr. Bradleys' actions.
V.

The trial court erred in ordering specific performance on the sale of the
property.
Specific performance is a remedy for breach of a legal or contractual obligation.
Black's Law Dictionary 1407 (7th ed.1999). To warrant specific performance "the aggrieved
party must make an unconditional tender of the performance required by the agreement"
Collard v. Nagle, 2002 UT App 306, \ 19, 57 P.3d 603 (emphasis added) (quoting Kelley v.

LeucadiaFin. Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1992)). To tender performance, the "Buyer
must have fully tendered, or stood ready to fully tender, her own performance under the
contract." Id.
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The ability to immediately fulfill one's responsibility under the contract is requisite for
claiming specific performance. Kelley v. Leucadia Yin. Corp., 846 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Utah 1992).
When a contract is clear as to the terms, parole evidence is not allowed, and the terms must
be followed strictly. Lee v. Barnes, 1999 UT App 126, f), 977 P.2d 550.
The Bradleys should not have been required to sell their home to the Markhams
under the doctrine of specific performance. In order for the Markhams to satisfy the specific
performance tender requirement, on September 12th the Markhams should have stood ready
to perform. The Markhams did not present several required documents in order to fully
perform.
The SFA specifically required the Buyer Financial Information Sheet to be submitted
concurrent with the SFA. Ms. Norton testified that the Markhams did not provide her with
the required information. The SFA also required the Markhams to submit a current credit
report by the Seller Disclosure Deadline, which was September 13. The Markhams admitted
at trial that they did not have a credit report with them when they met with Mr. Bradley on
September 13 and they did not fax or send a credit report to the Bradleys by the September
13 deadline. The trial court found that Mr. Markham had sufficient financial information
because he had "a prior financial statement" from 2003 and a "sample form . . . if the
Bradleys decided to adopt such a form/' [R. 277]. Mr. Markham testifies that he had to
whiteout and rewrite over the financial form before faxing it to Ms. Norton. [K 280]. On
September 12th the Markhams did not have a copy of their Credit Report as required by
Section 8 of the SFA
Even if the trial court was correct in finding that the Markhams were ready to
perform on September 12, their performance was not complete and they could not provide
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the Credit Report. The Markhams lacked the Credit Report as required by the Section 8 of
the SFA. [See Addendum "1"].
Because the Markhams failed to provide the required Buyer Financial Information
Sheet concurrent with the SFA and because they failed to provide the Bradleys with a credit
report as required by section 8.1 of the SFA, it is clear that the Markhams had not fully
performed under the contract and were not entitled to the remedy of specific performance.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the trial court's decision below and enter judgment as a
matter of law in favor of the Bradleys.

Respectfully submitted this

U day of June, 2007.

JUSTINB^LSWICK,
s&sciONE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY, L.L.C.,
Attorneys for Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this
day of June, 2007,1 served two copies of the foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS JOHN J. BRADLEY and DARBY G. BRADLEY
by the following method on the persons listed below:

Russell S. Mitchell

US Mail, postage prepaid

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK
& MCDONOUGH, P.C.

Facsimile

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
301 North 200 East, Suite 3-A
St. George, Utah 84770-3041

Hand-delivery

Telphone Number (435) 628-1627
Fax Number (435) 628-1610
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BRADLEY,
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ADDENDA
1. Real Estate Purchase Contract
2. Markham Financial Statement (September 12,2004)
3. Bradley Letter (September 20, 2004)
4. Norton Letter to Bradleys (September 24, 2004)
5. Markham Credit Report received with September 24,2004 Letter
6. Markham Financial Statement received with September 24, 2004 Letter
7. Norton Letter to Bradleys (September 27,2007)
8. Norton Letter to Bradleys (September 30,2007)
9. Countrywide Letter enclosed with September 30,2007 Letter
10. Robert Jensen Letter to Norton (October 4,2004)

ADDENDUM 1

REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
This hi a fegaify binding' contract Utah taw raquirec rta! t t t a l e licensees to use this form. Buyer and Seller, however, may agree to after or deieto
Ha provisions or to use a different form. If you desire legal or tax advice, consult your attorney or tax advfsor.

EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT
Buyer Doug and Prea MarKham
„ ,
r°P?$J% Pachas* »te Property
descnbed below and hereby delivers to the Brokerage, as Earnest Money, the amount of $1 .pOO.OO
in the form of
personal check
which, upon Acceptance of this offer by all parties (as defined in Section 23),
shall be deposited in accordance with state law.
Received by:

on

(Date)

(Signature of agent/broker acknowledges receipt of Earnest Money)

Brokerage: Century 21 At The Rockies/SLGeorge

Phone Number 435-673-9090

OFFER TO PURCHASE
1. PROPERTY:979 Dammeron Valley Drive
also described as: Pinion Hills subdivision
City of St. George

, County of

Washington

Stale of Utah, Zip

84783

(the "Property").

1.1 Included Items. Unless excluded herein, this sale includes the following items if presently owned and attached to
the Property: plumbing, heating, air conditioning fixtures and equipment; ceiling fans; water heater; built-in appliances;
light fixtures and bulbs; bathroom fixtures; curtains, draperies and rods; window and door screens; storm doors and
windows; window blinds; awnings; installed television antenna; satellite dishes and system; permanently affixed carpets;
automatic garage door opener and accompanying transmitters); fendng; and trees and shrubs. The following items shall
also be Included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title:
1.2 Excluded Items. The following items are excluded from this sale:
1.3 Water Rights. The following waterrightsare included in this sale: three shares wfth property and
anv other currently used on property
SL PURCHASE PRICE. The Purchase Price for the Property is $550,000.00
2.1 Method of Payment The Purchase Price will be paid as follows:
$
1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 (a) Earnest Money Deposit Under certain conditions described In this Contract THIS
DEPOSIT MAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE.
$
(b) New Loan. Buyer agrees to apply for a new loan as provided in Section 2.3. Buyer will apply
for one or more of the following loans: [ I CONVENTIONAL [ IFHA [ J VA
[ ] OTHER (specify)
If an FHA/VA loan applies, see attached FHA/VA Loan Addendum.
If the loan is to include any particular terms, then check below and give details:
[ ] SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS
$
$
$
$

265,000.00

(c) Loan Assumption Addendum (See attached Assumption Addendum if applicable)
(d) Seller Financing (see attached Seller Financing Addendum if applicable)
(e) Other (specify).
(f) Balance of Purchase Price In Cash at Settlement

$

550,000.00

PURCHASE PRICE. Total of lines (a) through (f)

285,000,00

2.2 Financing Condition, (check applicable box)
(a)
[ A ] Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for the applicable
loan(s) referenced in Section 2.1(b) or (c) (the "Loan"). This condition is referred to as the "Financing Condition."
(b)
[ ] Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for a loanSection 2.3 does not apply.
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2.3 Application for Loan.
(a) Buyer's duties. No later than the Loan Application & Fee Deadline referenced in Section 24(a), Buyer shall
apply for the Loan. 'Loan Application" occurs only when Buyer has: (I) completed, signed, and delivered to the lender (the
"Lender) the Initial loan application and documentation required by the Lender; and (11) paid all loan application fees as
required by the Lender. Buyer agrees to diligently work to obtain the Loan. Buyer will promptly provide the Lender with any
additional documentation as required by the Lender.
(b) Procedure If Loan Application Is denied. If Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Lender
does not approve the Loan (a 'Notice of Loan Denial"), Buyer shall, no later than three calendar days thereafter, provide a
copy to Seller. Buyer or Seller may, within three calendar days after Seller's receipt of such notice, cancel this Contract by
providing written notice to the other party. In the event of a cancellation under this Section 2.3(b): (i) if the Notice of Loan
Denial was received by Buyer no later than the Loan Denial Deadline referenced in Section 24(d), the Earnest Money
Deposit shall be returned to Buyer; (11) If the Notice of Loan Denial was received by Buyer after that date, the Earnest Money
Deposit shall be released to Seller, and Seller agrees to accept as Seller's exclusive remedy the Earnest Money Deposit as
liquidated damages. A failure to cancel as provided In this Section 2.3(b) shall have no effect on the Financing Condition set
forth In Section 2.2(a). Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of any other section of this Contract shall be governed by
such other provisions.
2.4 Appraisal Condition. Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property [)fl IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon the Property
appraising for not less than the Purchase Price. This condition is referred to as the 'Appraisal Condition". If the Appraisal
Condition applies and the Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Property has appraised for less than the
Purchase Price (a "Notice of Appraised Value"), Buyer may cancel this Contract by provicfing a copy of such written notice to
Seller no later than three days after Buyer's receipt of such written notice. In the event of a cancellation under this Section
2.4: (I) If the Notice of Appraised Value was received by Buyer no later than the Appraisal Deadline referenced In Section
24(e), the Earnest Money Deposit shall be returned to Buyer, (li) If the Notice of Appraised Value was received by Buyer
after that date, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Seller, and Seller agrees to accept as Seller's exclusive
remedy, the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages. A failure to cancel as provided In this Section 2.4 shall be
deemed a waiver of the Appraisal Condition by Buyer. Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of any other section of this
Contract shall be governed by such other provisions.
3.

SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING.

Settlement shall take place on the Settlement Deadline referenced In Section 24(0, or on a date upon which Byyor and
Seller agree In writing. *Settlemenr shall occur only when all of the following have been completed: (a) Buyer and Seller
have signed and delivered to each other or to the escrow/closing office all documents required by this Contract, by the
Lender, by written escrow Instructions or by applicable law; (b) any monies required to be paid by Buyer under these
documents (except for the proceeds of any new loan) have been delivered by Buyer to Seller or to the escrow/closing office
in the form of collected or cleared funds; and (c) any monies required to be paid by Seller under these documents have
been delivered by Seller to Buyer or to the escrow/closing office in the form of collected or cleared funds. Seller and Buyer
shall each pay one-half (Vfc) of the fee charged by the escrow/closing office for its services in the settlement/closing process.
Taxes and assessments for the current year, rents, and Interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated at Settlement as
set forth In this Section. Tenant deposits (including, but not limited to, security deposits, cleaning deposits and prepaid
rents) shall be paid or credited by Seller to Buyer at Settlement Prorations set forth In this Section shall be made as of the
Settlement Deadline date referenced in Section 24(f), unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties. Such writing
could include the settlement statement. The transaction will be considered closed when Settlement has been completed,
and when all of the following have been completed: (i) the proceeds of any new loan have been delivered by the Lender to
Seller or to the escrow/closing office; and (ii) the applicable Closing documents have been recorded in the office of the
county recorder. The actions described in parts 0) and (ii) of the preceding sentence shall be completed within four calendar
days of Settlement.
4. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver physical possession to Buyer within: [ J
M Other (specify) funding and recording
5.
[

hours [ ]

days after Closing;

CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Contract:
] Seller's Initials [ J Buyer's Initials

The Listing Agent, Darby Bradley

, represents pQ Seller [ J Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller
as a Limited Agent;
, represents [XJ Seller [ ] Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller
as a Limited Agent;

The Listing Broker, Red Desert Realty
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The Selling Agent. Carolyn Norton/Stewart Shumway

, represents I ] Seller

The Selling Broker. Century 21 / Russ Gwiiliam

, represents [ ] Seller

[X] Buyer I ] both Buyer and Seller
as a Limited Agent;
[XJ Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller
as a Limited Agent;

6, TITLE INSURANCE. At Settlement, Seller agrees to pay for a standard-coverage owner's policy of title insurance
insuring Buyer in the amount of the Purchase Price. Any additional title insurance coverage shall be at Buyer's expense.
7. SELLER DISCLOSURES. No later than the Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24(b). Seller shall
provide to Buyer the following documents which are collectively referred to as the "Seller Disclosures":
(a) a Seller property condition disclosure for the Property, signed and dated by Seller;
(b) a commitment for the policy of title insurance;
(c) a copy of any leases affecting the Property not expiring prior to Closing;
(d) written notice of any claims and/or conditions known to Seller relating to environmental problems and building or
zoning code violations; and
(e) Other (specify)
.

8. BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS. Buyer's obligation to purchase
under this Contract (chock applicable boxes):
(a) [ X I IS [ J IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the content of all the Seller Disclosures referenced in
Section 7;
(b) [ X I IS [ J IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a physical condition inspection of the Property;
(c) [ X I IS [ 1 IS NOTconcfitioned upon Buyer's approval of a survey of the Property by a licensed surveyor ("Survey");
(d) I 1 IS [ X I IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the cost terms and availability of homeowner's insurance
coverage for the Property;
(e) [ J IS [ X I IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the following tests and evaluations of the Property: (specify)
If any of the above items are checked in the affirmative, then Sections 8.1,8.2,8.3 and 8.4 apply; otherwise, they do not
apply. The items checked in the affirmative above are collectively referred to as the •Evaluations & Inspections." Unless
otherwise provided in this Contract, the Evaluations & Inspections shall be paid for by Buyer and shall be conducted by
incfividuals or entities of Buyer's choice. Seller agrees to cooperate with the Evaluations & Inspections and with the walkthrough inspection under Section 11.
8,1 Evaluations & Inspections Deadline. No later than the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline referenced in
Section 24(c) Buyer shall: (a) complete all Evaluations & Inspections; and (b) determine if the Evaluations & Inspections
are acceptable to Buyer.
& 2 Right to Cancel or Object If Buyer determines that the Evaluations & Inspections are unacceptable, Buyer may,
no later than the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline, either: (a) cancel this Contract by provkSng written notice to Seller,
whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer; or (b) provide Seller with written notice of objections.
8.3 Failure to Respond. If by the expiration of the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline, Buyer does not: (a) cancel
this Contract as provided in Section 8.2; or (b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding the Evaluations & Inspections,
the Evaluations & Inspections shall be deemed approved by Buyer.
&4 Response by Seller. If Buyer provides written objections to Seller, Buyer and Seller shall have seven calendar
days after Seller's receipt of Buyer's objections (the "Response Period") in which to agree in writing upon the manner of
resolving Buyer's objections. Except as provided in Section 10.2, Seller may, but shall not be required to, resolve Buyer's
objections. If Buyer and Seller have not agreed in writing- upon the manner of resolving Buyer's objections, Buyer may
cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller no later than three calendar days after expiration of the Response
Period; whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer. If this Contract is not canceled by Buyer under
this Section 8.4, Buyer's objections shall be deemed waived by Buyer. This waiver shall not affect those items warranted
in Section 10.
9. ADDITIONAL TERMS. There [X] ARE [ ] ARE NOT addenda to this Contract containing additional terms. If there
are, the terms of the following addenda are incorporated into this Contract by this reference: [ X 1 Addendum

No.J
[ X I Seller Financing Addendum [ ] FHA/VA Loan Addendum [ ] Assumption Addendum [ 1 Lead-Based Paint
Disclosure & Acknowledgement (in some transactions this disclosure is required by law) [ ] Lead-Based Paint
Addendum (in some transactions this addendum Is required by law) [ ] Other (specify):
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10. SELLER WARRANTIES & REPRESENTATIONS.
10.1
Condition of Title. Seller represents that Seller has fee title to the Property and will convey good and
marketable title to Buyer at Closing by general warranty deed. Buyer agrees, however, to accept title to the Property
subject to the following matters of record: easements, deed restrictions, CC&R's (meaning covenants, conditions and
restrictions), andrights-of-way;and subject to the contents of the Commitment for Title Insurance as agreed to by Buyer
under Section 8. Buyer also agrees to take the Property subject to existing leases affecting the Properly and not expiring
prior to Closing. Buyer agrees to be responsible for taxes, assessments, homeowners association dues, utilities, and other
services provided to the Property after Closing. Except for any loan(s) specifically assumed by Buyer under Section
2.1(c). Seller will cause to be paid off by Closing all mortgages, trust deeds, judgments, mechanic's liens, tax liens and
warrants. Seller will cause to be paid current by Closing all assessments and homeowners association dues.
10.2
Condition of Property. Seller warrants that the Property will be in the following condition ON THE DATE
SELLER DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER:
(a) the Property shall be broom-clean and free of debris and personal belongings. Any Seller or tenant moving-related
damage to the Property shall be repaired at Seller's expense;
(b) the heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and sprinkler systems and fixtures, and the appliances and fireplaces will
be in working order and fit for their intended purposes;
(c) the roof and foundation shall be free of leaks known to Seller;
(d) any private well or septic tank serving the Property shall have applicable permits, and shall be in working order
and fit for its intended purpose; and
(o) the Property and improvements, including the landscaping, will be in the same general condition as they were on
the date of Acceptance.
10.3
Home Warranty Plan. The "Home Warranty Plan" referenced in this Section 10.3 is separate from the
warranties provided by Seller under Sections 10.1 and 10.2 above. (Check applicable boxes): A one-year Home
Warranty Plan [XI WILL [ ] WILL NOT be included in this transaction. If included, the Home Warranty Plan shall be
ordered by [ ] Buyer [ ] Seller and shall be issued by a company selected by [ X I Buyer [ ] Seller. The cost of the
Home Warranty Plan shall not exceed $350
and shall be paid for at Settlement by [ j Buyer [XI Seller.
11. WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION. Before Settlement, Buyer may, upon reasonable notice and at a reasonable time,
conduct a "walk-through" inspection of the Property to determine only that the Property is "as represented," meaning that
the items referenced In Sections 1.1,8.4 and 10.2 (The items") are respectively present repaired/changed as agreed, and
in the warranted condition. If the Items are not as represented, Seller will, prior to Settlementreplace,correct orrepairthe
items or, with the consent of Buyer (and Lender if applicable), escrow an amount at Settlement to provide for the same.
The failure to conduct a walk-through inspection, or to claim that an item is not as represented, shall not constitute a
waiver by Buyer of therightto receive, on the date of possession, the Items as represented.
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that from the date of Acceptance until the date of Closing, none
of the following shall occur without the prior written consent of Buyer (a) no changes in any existing leases shall be made;
(b) no new leases shall be entered into; (c) no substantial alterations or improvements to the Property shall be made or
undertaken; and (d) no further financial encumbrances to the Property shall be made.
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, limited liability company, or
other entity, the person executing this Contract on its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer and
Seller.
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Contract together with its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures,
constitutes the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes. and replaces any and all prior negotiations,
representations, warranties, understandings or contracts between the parties. This Contract cannot be changed except by
written agreement of the parties.
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute, arising prior to or after Closing, related to this Contract
(check applicable box)
[ ]SHALL
[X] MAY AT THE OPTION OF THE PARTIES
first be submitted to mediation. If the parties agree to mediation, the dispute shall be submitted to mediation through a
mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the parties. Each party agrees to bear its own costs of mediation. If
mediation fails, the other procedures and remedies available under this Contract shall apply. Nothing in this Section 15
shall prohibit any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation.
16. DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect either to retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or to
return it and sue Buyer to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies available at law. If Seller defaults, in
addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect either to accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest
Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies
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available at law. If Buyer elects to accept liquidated damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon
demand. It is agreed that denial of a Loan Application made by the Buyer is not a default and is governed by Section
2.3(b).
17. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. In the event of litigation or binding arbitration to enforce this Contract, the prevailing
party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. However, attorney fees shall not be awarded for participation
in mediation under Section 15.
18. NOTICES. Except as provided in Section 23, all notices required under this Contract must be: (a) in writing; (b)
signed by the party giving notice; and (c) received by the other party or the other party's agent no later than the applicable
date referenced in this Contract.
19. ABROGATION. Except for the provisions of Sections 10.1, 10.2, 15 and 17 and express warranties made in this
Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not apply after Closing.
20. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss to the Property, including physical damage or destruction to the Property or its
improvements due to any cause except ordinary wear and tear and loss caused by a taking in eminent domain, shall be
borne by Seller until the transaction is closed.
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this Contract. Extensions must be
agreed to in writing by all parties. Unless otherwise explicitly stated in this Contract: (a) performance under each Section
of this Contract which references a date shall absolutely be required by 5:00 PM Mountain Time on the stated date; and (b)
the term "days" shall mean calendar days and shall be counted beginning on the day following the event which triggers the
timing requirement (i.e., Acceptance, Notice of Loan Denial, etc.). Performance dates and times referenced herein shall
not be binding upon title companies, lenders, appraisers and others not parties to this Contract, except as otherwise agreed
to in writing by such non-party.
22. FAX TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile (fax) transmission of a signed copy of this Contract, any
addenda and counteroffers, and the retransmission of any signed fax shall be the same as delivery of an original. This
Contract and any addenda and counteroffers may be executed in counterparts.
23. ACCEPTANCE. "Acceptance" occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other: (a)
signs the offer or counteroffer where noted to Indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or to the other
party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required.
24. CONTRACT DEADLINES. Buyer and Seller agree that the following deadlines shall apply to this Contract:
(a) Loan Application & Fee Deadline

September 6,2004

(Date)

(b) Seller Disclosure Deadline

September 13, 2004

(Date)

(c) Evaluations & Inspections Deadline

October 4. 2004

(Date)

(d) Loan Denial Deadline

September 30. 2004

(Date)

(e) Appraisal Deadline

September 30. 2004

(Date)

(f) Settlement Deadline

October 29, 2004

(Date)

25. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the Property on the above terms and conditions. If
Seller does not accept this offer by: 5:00
[ ] AM [X] PM Mountain Time on September'*'2004
(Date),
•shall lapse; and the Brokerage shall return the Earnest Money Deposit to Buyer

V\^l
(Buyer's Signature)

ittfre)

(Offer Date)

(Offer Date)

The later of the above Offer Dates shall be referred to w the "Offer Reference Date"

Doug and Prea Markham
(Buyers' Names) (PLEASE PRINT)
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ACCEPT ANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION
CHECK ONE:
[ ] ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified
above.
[ ] COUNTEROFFER: Seller presents for Buyer's Acceptance the terms of Buyer's offer subject to the exceptions or
modifications as specified in the attached ADDENDUM NO.
.
(Seller's Signature)

(Date) (Time)

(Sellers'Names) (PLEASE PRINT)

(Seller's Signature)
(Notice Address)

(Date) (Time)
(Zip Code)

(Phone)

[ J REJECTION: Seller Rejects the foregoing offer.
(Seller's Signature)

(Date) (Time)

(Seller's Signature)

(Date) (Time)

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
State law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Contract bearing all signatures. (Rll in applicable
section below.)
fledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing (Jtoptfacrtbearing ^li signatures:
(Buyer's Signature)
Doug Markham

(Date)

\y (Buyer's SiQqfatufe)
Drea Me

(Seller's Signature)

(Date)

(Seller's Signature)

v

(Date)

(Date)

B. I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Contract bearing all signatures to be [ 1 faxed [ ] mailed [ ] hand
delivered on
(Date), postage prepaid, to the [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer.
Sent/Delivered by (specify)
THS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION ANO THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL,
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 5,2003. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THS FORM.
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SELLER RNANCING ADDENDUM
TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
THIS SELLER RNANCING ADDENDUM is made a part of that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with
an Offer Reference Date of August 3 1 . 2004
, between Doug and Drea Markham
as Buyer, and Jay and Darhy Rmritey
as Seller, regarding
the Property located at 979 Dammeron Valley Drive
. The terms of this ADDENDUM are
hereby incorporated as part of the REPC.
1. CREDIT DOCUMENTS. Seller's extension of credit to Buyer shall be evidenced by: [x] Note and Deed of Trust
[ ] Note and All-Inclusive Deed of Trust [ I Other:
2. CREDIT TERMS. The terms of the credit documents referred to in Section 1 above are as follows:
$285000
principal amount of the note (the "Note"); interest at 5.5
% per annum; payable at approximately
$ 939ft fi9 per month
. The entire unpaid balance of principal plus accrued interest is due inlflQ months
from date of the Note. First payment due December 1. f 04 . Additional principal payments, balloon payments or other
terms as follows: $100,000 due on December 1 , 2005 r after balloon payment, monthly payment will be

reduced to $1,511,60
The credit documents referenced in Section 1 of this ADDENDUM will contain a due<xi-sale clause in favor of Seller. Seller
agrees to provide to Buyer at Settlement: (a) an amortization schedule based on the above terms; (b) a written disclosure
of the total interest Buyer will pay to maturity of the Note; and (c) the annual percentage rate on the Note based on loan
closing costs.
3- TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS. In addition to the payments referenced in Section 2 above, Buyer shall also be
responsible for (a) property taxes; (b) homeowners association dues; (c) special assessments; and (d) hazard insurance
premiums on the Property. These obligations will be paid: [ I directly to Seller/Escrow Agent on a monthly basis [x
1 directly to the applicable county treasurer, association, and insurance company as required by those entities.
4. PAYMENT. Buyer's payments under Sections 2 and 3 above wiD be made to: [X] Seller [ ] an Escrow Agent If an
Escrow Agent,
will act as Escrow Agent and will be responsible for disbursing payments
on any underlying mortgage or deed of trust (the "underlying mortgage") and to the Seller. Cost of setting up the escrow
account shall be paid by: [ ] Buyer [ ] Seller [ I split evenly between the parties.
5. LATE PAYMENT/PREPAYMENT. Any payment not made within 15
days after it is die is subjecttoa late charge
of $25
or
% of the installment due, whichever is greater. Amounts in default shall bear interest at a rate
of 5 J 5 _ _ % per annum. All or part of the principal balance on the Note may be paid prior to maturity wfthout penalty.
6. DUE-ON-SALE As part of the Seller Disclosures referenced in Section 7 of the REPC, Seller shall provide to Buyer a
copy of the underlying mortgage, the note secured thereby, and the amortization schedule. Buyer's obligation to purchase
under this Contract is conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the content of those documents, in accordance with Section 8
of .the REPC. If the holder of the underlying mortgage calls the loan due as a result of this transaction, Buyer agrees to
discharge the underlying loan as required by the mortgage lender. In such event, Seller's remaining equity shall be paid as
provided in the credit documents.
7. BUYER DISCLOSURES. Buyer has provided to Seller, as a required part of this ADDENDUM, the attached Buyer
Financial Information Sheet. Buyer may use the Buyer Financial Information Sheet approved by the Real Estate Commission
and the Attorney General's Office, or may provide comparable written information in a different format, together with such
additional information as Seller may reasonably require. Buyer [ J WILL [x] WILL NOT provide Seller with copies of IRS
returns forthe two preceding tax years. Buyer acknowledges that Seller may contact Buyer's current employer for verification
of employment as represented by Buyer in the Buyer Financial Information Sheet.
8. SELLER APPROVAL By the Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24(b) of the REPC, Buyer shall provide
to Seller, at Buyer's expense, a current credit report on Buyer from a consumer creditreportingagency. Seller may use the
credit report and the information referenced in Section 7 of this Addendum ("Buyer Disclosures") to evaluate the creditworthiness of Buyer.
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8.1 Seller Review. By the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline referenced in Section 24(c) of the REPC, Seller shall
review the credit report and the Buyer Disclosures to determine if the content of the credit report and the Buyer Disclosures,
is acceptable. If the content of the credit report or the Buyer Disclosures is not acceptable to Seller, Seller may elect to
either: (a) provide written objections to Buyer as provided in Section 8.2 of this ADDENDUM; or (b) immediately cancel the
REPC by providing written notice to Buyer by the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline referenced in Section 24(c) of the
REPC. The Brokerage, upon receipt of a copy of Seller's written notice of cancellation, shall return to Buyer the Earnest
Money Deposit.
8.2 Seller Objections. If Seller does not immediately cancel the REPC as provided above, Seller may, by the
Evaluations & Inspections Deadline referenced in Section 24(c) of the REPC, provide Buyer with written objections. Buyer
and Sefler shall have seven calendar days after Buyer's receipt of the objections (the "Response Period") in which to agree
in writing upon the manner of resolving Seller's objections. Buyer may, but shall not be required to, resolve Seller's
objections. If Seller and Buyer have not agreed in writing upon the manner of resolving Seller's objections, Seller may cancel
the REPC by providing written notice to Buyer no later than three calendar days after expiration of the Response Period.
The Brokerage, upon receipt of a copy of Seller's written notice of cancellation, shall return to Buyer the Earnest Money
Deposit.
8.3 Failure to Object. If Seller does not deliver a written objection to Buyer regarding the credit report or a Buyer
Disclosure by the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline referenced in Section 24(c) of the REPC or cancel the REPC as
provided in Sections 8.1 or 8.2 of this ADDENDUM, the credit report and Buyer Disclosures will be deemed approved by
Seller.
9. TITLE INSURANCE. Buyer [ I SHALL [ J SHALL NOT provide to Seller a lender's policy of title insurance in the
amount of the Indebtedness to the Setter, and shall pay for such policy at Settlement
10. DISCLOSURE OF TAX ©ENTIHCATION NUMBERS. By no later than Settlement Buyer and Seller shall disclose
to each other their respective Sociaf Security Numbers or other applicable tax identification numbers so that they may compfy
with federal laws on reporting mortgage interest in filings with the Internal Revenue Service.
To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including all prior addenda
and counteroffers, these terms shall control. AH other terms of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers, not
modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [XJ Seller [ 1 Buyer shall have until 5 f l 0
f ]AM[XJPM
Mountain Time on September 1. 2004
(Date), to accept the terms of this SEll.FR FINANCING ADDENDUM in
accordance with Section 23 of the REPC. Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this SELLER FINANCING
ADDENDUM shall lapse.
[ ] Buyer [ J Seller Signature

(Date) (Time)

Social Security Number

[ J Buyer [ ] Seller Signature

(Date) (Time)

Social Security Number

ACCEPTANCOCOUNTEROFFER/REJECTION
CHECK ONE:
[ ] ACCEPTANCE: [ ] Seller [ J Buyer hereby accepts these terms.
t J COUNTEROFFER:! ] Seller [ ] Buyer presents £s a counteroffer the terms set forth on the attached ADDENDUM
NO.

T~JI/\/l -—^- <\^H
(Signature)
[

—-""^

(Date) (Time)

(Signature)

(Date) (Time)

1 REJECTION:! ] Seller [ 1 Buyer rejects the foregoing SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM.

(Signature)

(Date) (Time)

(Signature)

(Date) (Time)

THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL,
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 17, 199& FT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSK>NS OF THIS FORM,

Page 2 of 2 pages

Seller's Initials

Date

Buyer's Initials

P ^

*

Date

I ~f

^ j

Pagel

of JL

ADDENDUM NO. 1
TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
THIS IS AN [X] ADDENDUM [ ] COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with
an Offer Reference Date of A u g u s t 3 1 , 2004
, including all prior addenda and counteroffers, between
Doug and Drea Markham
as Buyer, and Jay and Darby Bradley
as Seller,
regarding the Property located at979 Dammeron v a l l e y Drive
. The
following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC:
1) S e l l e r agrees t o complete construction of home.
2) Buyer and S e l l e r t o l i s t expectations of completion upon next t r i p t o S t . George
i n mid September.
3)

Furniture t o be included,

( s e l l e r t o attach l i s t of included items)

BUYER AND SELLER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADUNES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC
(CHECK APPLICABLE BOX): [Xj REMAIN UNCHANGED [ ] ARE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS:
/ T o the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including all prior addenda
and counteroffers, these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, inducing all prior addenda and counteroffers,
1 by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [ X I Seller ( J Buyer shall have until 5 : 0 0 [ ] AM [X] PM
Mountainllmcrorr^ggnacfe 31 r 2004
(Date), to accept the terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance with the
provisions of Section 23 of the REPC. Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this ADDENDUM shall lapse.
^ < j Buyer [ ] Seller^ignature

(Date)

(Time)

[ ] Buyer [ ] Seller Signature

(Date)

(Time)

ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION
CHECK ONE:
[ J ACCEPTANCE: [ J Seller [ J Buyer hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM.
[ ] COUNTEROFFER: [ ] Seller [ I Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO.
(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Date)

(Time)

[ J REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ J Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM.
(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

THtS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL,
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 5, 2003. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM.
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ADDENDUM NO. 3
TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
TOSBANt l^DWDUM W C O W m a W f ^
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£ * £- If
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT
[ and Dtea Martcham
offers to purchase lte Property
I hereby delivers to the Brokerage, as Earnest Money, the amount of SI ,000.00
in the lorm of
- - - r r - .. which, upon Acceptance o( this offer by all parties (as defined in Section 23).
r-.
shall be derxjsiterJTh accordance with state law.
Received by:

on

Brokerage: Century 21 At The Rockie^StGeorne

(Date)

Phone Number 435-673-9090

OFFER TO PURCHASE
i.

PRQPEKTY:979 Daraneron VaBey Drive

ateo described as: Pinion Hflte subdivision
City of S t George

.County of

Washington

.Slate of Uteri 25p

84783

rfiie^yropCTtvn-

1-1 Included Rem*, Ijnteas sxc&sded herein, thfe sale Inrfudes ihefdlowng rfems a presently owned and attached to
#ie Property: pJufBdaing, teating,. air conrJtioring ibdures and equipment; ceiling fans; water heater; built-in appliances;
%$$ fixtures a i d iaJbs; bathroom fixtiffes; curtains, draperies and rods; window and door screens; storm doors and
windows; window Winds; awnings; installed television entertna; satellite cfehes and system; permanently affixed carpets;
automatic garage door opener end accompanying inaisrnitlerfe); fencing; and trees and shrubs. The following items shall
also be indMded in this sale aid conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title:
l-2E»!kKi8(f tew. The fciJowing tens are excluded tram this safe:
1.3 Water Right*. The fafow^ w s ^ rio^

mwofow mrrertfrf used on property
2,
$
$

PURCHASE PRICE. The Purdttase Price for 1he Property is g 5 5 0 , ( m 0 0
2.1 ttoftod of Payment The Purchase Price mil be paid as follows:
1,000,00
(*) Earnest Homy Daposft Under certain conditions described in ttUA Contract THIS
0S*O3n"«iAY a H X M y E T O T J U J - Y i O W ^ ^ N D ^ L E .
<b) New Loan. Buyer agrees to apply fcr a new loan as p r ^
Buyer will apply
for one or more of the following loans: [ ] COWVEMTIONAL [ IFHA [ J VA
M O T H E R (specify)
,
If an FHA/VA loan applies* see attached ft^AA/A L o ^ Addendum.
If the loan Is to include any particular terms* then cnacic below a i d give details:
[ J SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS

$
$
$

285.000.00

$_

2^.000.00

(0) Loan Assumption Addendum (See attached Assumption Addendum if applicable)
(d) Sonar Financing (see attached Seller Financing Addendum if applicable)
(ft) Other (specify;.
(f) Baianc* of Purciiase Price In Cash at Settlement

$_

550,000.00

PURCHASE PRICE. Total of lines (a) through (f)

2 2 Financing Condition, (check applicable box)
(a)
{A} Buyets obligation to purchase the Property IS conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for the applicable
toan(s)referencedin Section 2.1(b) or (c) (^ "Loan"). This condition is referred to as the 'Financing Condition.*
(b)
( ] Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for a loan.
Section 2.3 does not apply.
V
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2 3 Application for Loan.
(a) Buy*?* duties, No later than the Loan Application & Fee Deadfine referenced in Section 24(a), Buyer shall
applyforlhe Leaa loan Appfcafioif occurs only when Buyer has: (?) competed, s&gned, and delivered to One lender (the
"Lender) the inifiafl loan appicafion and documentation required by the lender; and (H) paid all loan application fees as
maaafed by toe Lender- Bu^agn3eslod%jein%warktoGbt^
Buyerw$ prornptfy provfcte the Lenderwtthany
adStional documentation as reaped by the Lender.
<*>) Procodum If Loan Application is; denJad. if Buysr receive w?9$an notice irom the Lender #iat the Lender
(toes not approve the Loan (a "Nogoo of Loan Denial")* Buyer shall, no late- then three cale«idar d 2 ^ thef^^ft^, provide a
copytoSetier, Buyer or Se&^ may, wfthin three c a t e n a
prnvicir^ wriStoi rK^ce to tie o»^f party. In the event of a canceSialfon under this Section 2-3<bj: 0) & the Notice of Loan
DaniaJ was received by Buyer no later than the Loan DeniaJ Deadline referenced in Section 24(d), the Earnest Money
DeposftshsSberBtornedtoBu^r^tf
Deposit shafl be released to Setter, and SeSer agrees to accept as Sailer's exclusive remedy the Earnest Mon ey Depoa ft as
flqutdafced damages* A f a f c ^ t o c a n ^ m p r a w a a ^ m ^ S e c ^
forth Hi Section 2J2{&). CanceSaian pursuant lo tie provisions of any otter secfion of tils Contract shall be governed by
such other provtefons.
2 4 ApprdtatCoodBttofi. Buyers obigaison to purchase tie Property pfl IS I ] IS NOT concfitioned upon the Property
appraising for not Jess than the Purtf^p? Price. This condWon is referred to as the "Appraisal Condffion*'. W the Appraisal
ConcS&on appSes -a^jd #*e Bus«r recedes written no#cefcom fhe Lender that foe Property has appraised for less than the
Purchase Price (a "Notice of Appraised Value"), Buyer may cancel this Contract by provicfing a copy of such written notice to
Satfartio later f ^ t & a e days aQer Buyer's r e ^ ^
m fae ewent of a cancelation under this Section
2.4: (i) if the NoBce erf Appraised Value was received by Buyer no later than Ihe Appraisal Deadfine referenced in Secflon
24(e\. lhe Earnest Money Deposit shall be resumed to Buyer; (H) if the Notice of Appraised Value was received by Buyer
afer that date* the EarnestfctoneyDeposit sftal be released to Seller, and Seller agrees to accept as Seller's exefuswe
remedy, lh& Earnest Money Deposit as Gqufdated damages. A failure to cancel as provided in this Section 2.4 shall be
deemed a waiver of fl*e Appraisal Conefiiion by Buyer. Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of any other section of this
Contact shall be governed by such other provfsioris.
3. SETTLEMENT AND CLOSiNa
Stfttenient shall teks pte(?e on the Settlement Deadline referenced in Section 24(f), or on a date upon which Buyer and
Saftar agree in ws$ng- "Seffiemmtr shafi occur ortfy vhm all ot the fttoi^ to^ b e ^ cOTipfefed: (a) Buyer and Seller
have dgned and delivered to each otiw or fo the escrowfciosing office aS documents required by this Contract, by the
Lender, by written escrow Instructions or by app&cabte law; <b) any monies nsai&ed to be paid by Buyer under these
dooflttenis (except to- the proceeds ef any new ban) have been dafotered by Buyer to Seller or to the escro^dosing office
fn the tern of co&eded or cteared funds; and (cj ^tfy monies requitedtobe paid by Salter under these documents have
Seen deferred by SeSer to B i ^ or ^
Seller and Buyer
shaSeacb pay one-half {¥§ of the fee cfoargedby 1ha escrow/c&jstng officefortinservices in the settiement/blosing process.
Taxes and assessments fre ti» a ^ ^
set fortrj-ki this Section. Tenant deposit (incSurjinG, but not Bmrted to, security deports, cleaning deposits and prepaid
nen^afoa&bepaldorcred^b^^
Prorations set forth ^ this Secttonshali be madeasofthe
Secernent Deacfine date referenced in Sesfion 24(f). unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties. Such writing
coukiindkidB the senjement statement Ute transaction wii] be consUen^l closed when Settlement has been completed,
and when «$ of thefotowSngtaflabeen computet (i) theproceeds of any new loan have been deHv^red by the Lender to
SGSBC or to the escroratffefosing offt»; and (^ t © applfc^te Cfosing documents have been recorded rn the office of me
county rwoider. Tte sK^onso^scrfeed In parte (i) and (1Q of tn^
days of Settlement
4. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver physical possession to Buyer within: [ ]
DO Other ttoectfv) funding and recording

hows £ J
„

days attar Closing;
.
_

5. CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY OtaXOSURE, At the signing of this Contract:
t ^ / J Setter* InWate [ ] Buy**** Initials
The Ustino Anent. Darby BradteV

x

The Lis^no Broker. Bed Desert Reattv

f
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Seller's inmate

<^

tepreserts £XJ Salter [ ] Buyer [ J both Buyer and Setter
aft a Limited Aoeitt;
represents £XI Seite £ ] toyw[ I both Buyer and Seller
as a Limited Agent;

IW»JLilJll

Buyor'* Inttlate

^ ^

Date.

f///
TheSeflami Agent. Carolyn Norton/Stewart Shumwav
TMSe8fl^Bn^eir,Centigy21/ RussGvflffiam

. represents f I Seller [X] Buyer j jboth Buyer and Seller
as a Limited Agent;
,repnasents£ J SeBer M Buyer { J both Buyer wd Seller
« i a Limited Agent;

6- TITLE INSURANCE. At Settlement, SeMer sgraes to pay tor a siaraian&ccverage owner's po&cy of ##e snsurartce
insuring Buyer in the amount of the Purchase Price. Any add&ona* ^insurance coverage shall be af Buyer's axpense.
7- SELLH1 DISCLOSURES. No later than the Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24(b). Seller shall
provkfe to BuyertfiefatoMng documents vtiucti are co&ectrvely retired to as the "Setter Disclosures":
(a) a Seller property corioWonifed^
fbl a commitment for ihe policy of title insurance;
(C) a copy of any leases aiffec&t^ the Property i ^
(d) written notice of any claims and/or conditions known to Seller relating to environmental problems and building or
zoning code violations; and
(e) Other (specify)

a BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCH- BASED ON EVAliJATlGNS AND INSPECTIONS. Buyer's obligation to purdrxose
ander this Contract (check applicable box**):
(a) DQIS { ] & ^ T condoned upon BuyW^appr^^
Section 7;
{*>) DQIS £ JISMOTcoiixli&onedupanBuye^
| q M S [ ]ISMOrrOTnc§fof^u|X)nBu^saffl
(d) I J ® fXJSHOTcorjc&for^up^
coverage fa* tie Property:
I*) I I ® 1X1 IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the follcwing tests and evatoaikjris of the Property; (specify)
If any of the above items are checked in the affirmgfoe, then SecSons 8.1,8.2, &3 aid 8,4 apply; otherwise, they do not
appfiy. The items o&ec&ti m the af§rmat*ve 3fr»e am cxritecMv^
Unless
othermse provided in titis Contact, fie Evafej^kms & Inspector shall be paid for by Buyer and shall be conducted by
w&vkktQlsor entities o$ Buyer's choice. Seller agrees to cooperate wth thfc Evaluations & inspections and with the walkIfcough inspection under Section 11a.1 Evaluations h Inspections Dwdllna. No later than the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline referenced in
Secfcn 2*(Q)fii^yer&aik (a) comp&ie al Evsfoafans &tospecSons;and (fa) d^smrire ff fl^ Evaluations & inspections
am acceptable to Buyer.
&2 raghttoGKoca!orObidCL If Buyer detemtenies thai the Evatuatf^
no later than the Bragua&ons & InspecSons DearJine, erfoer: (a) cancel fsis Contract by provjdng written notice to Seller,
whereupon the Earnest Mooey Deposit shall be released to Buyer; or (b) provide Setter with written notice of objections.
8 3 Failure to Respond. If by the expkafen of the Evalua&ons & [inspections Deadline, Buyer does not; (a) cancel
&n"s Contract as pttwded in Section 8.2; or (b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding the Evaluations & Inspections,
the &ratua£on& £ fetspedfons shaft be deemed approved by Buyers ' R«pon»e by Seite*. If Buyer provides written objections to SeBer, Buy©-wtd Seller shall have seven calendar
d ^ s after Safins nsdegpt of Buyer's obpectiorBS {the -Response PmocT) In which to agree* in writing upon the manner of
resolving Buyer's ob^ecttons. Except as provided in Section 10.2, Seller may, but shall not be required to, resolve Buyer's
obfec&ms. If Buyer and SeMer have not agreed in writing upon the manner of resolving Buyer's objections. Buyer may
caned Ms Contract by pravking written notice to Setter no later than three calendar days after expiration of the Response
Period; whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer. If this Contract is not canceled by Buyer under
this Section 8.4, Buyer's abjections shall be deemed waived by Buyer. This waiver shall not affect those items warranted
in Section 10,
9. ADDITIONAL TERMS. There DQ ARE [ ] ARE NOT addenda to this Contract containing additional terms. If there
are, the terms of the following addenda are incorporated into this Contract by this reference: I X ] Addendum
No.j
] ^ S a ^ B n » w * i g A i ^ t o « l u m [ IFHA/VA Loan Addendum I ] Assumption Addondurn [ ] Laad-Bwed Paint
Dtectottmi & Ackmwkrigemem ^
I ] Lead-Based Paint
Add©fxtum(ki«nwtnjn*j**k^
[ ] Other (spoeffy):
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10. SELLER WARRANTIES X R e ^ ^ S a f T A H Q N a
10.1 Condition of TiflgL Setter represents ttoai SeHer has fee titte K» the Poverty and witt convoy good and
marketable title to Buyer at Closing by genenafl warranty deed Buyer agrees, however, to accept titte to the Property
subgect to thefctftowingmatters of record: easements, cteed restrictions, CC&R's (meaning covenants, conditions and
restrictions), andrights-of-way;^ K J subject to the contents of the Commitment for Tito Insurance as agreed to by Buyer
under Section & Buyer ateo agnses to Jake the psoperty subject to existing teases affecting the Property &vi not expiring
prior to Closing. Buyer agrees to be responsible tor taxes, assessments, homecwmers association dtjes, utilities, and oilier
services provided to the Property after Closing. Except tor any loan(s) specifically assumed by Buyer under Section
2L1{C), Se8er wii3 cause to be p&d off by dosing aft mortgages, trust deeds, judgments, mechanic's liens, tax liens and
warrants. Seller wMicmise to be paid current by Gtoswi^
14X2 Condition of Property. Sailer warrants that the Property will be m the fofJowmg concfition ON THE DATE
SELLER PEUVeW PffYSIGftt, POSSESSION TO BUYEH:
(a) fiie Property ahuall be broom-dean and free of debris and personal belongings. Any Seller or tenant moving-related
damage to the Property sha! berepairedat Setters expense;
(b) the heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing, and sprinkler systems and fixtures, and the appliances and fireplaces will
b8teiworidng order and fit for t t o r attended purposes;
(c) the roof aid foundation shall be free of leeks known to Seller;
.(**} any private weSI or septie tank serving the Property shall have applicable permits, erci shall be in working order
and fit to* its intended purpose; and
(e) the Property and improvements, inducfit^} the landscaping, wilt be in the same general condition as tUey were on
the dale of Acceptance.
1&3 Home Warranty Ptei. The "Home Warranty Plan" referenced \n this Section 10.3 is separate from the
warranties provided by SeHer urxler Sections 10.1 and 1(L2 above. (Check applicable bora*); A one-year Home
Wamfflfly Plan [XI WILL { J WILL NOT be included in this transaction. If inducted, the Home Warranty Plan shall be
ordered by { 1 Buy*r £ ] Sailer aid steS! be issued by aoompany Selected by [ X I Buyer I J Sailer. Tire cost of the
Home W a n ^ Plan sha!2 not e x c e c r i } ^
j Buyer [XJ Salter.
11. WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION. Before Settlement, Buyer may, upon reasonable notice and at a reasonable time,
conduct a "wafk^iiough" SnepesSon of the Property to determine only tisi the Properly is *as represented," meaning that
fhBftemsreferenced in Secfens 1A. 8,4 md 10.2 (The items") arerespectivelypresent repafredfchanged as agreed, and
intoisairantedcaracftioa. if l i t e m s are not as repses^
items or, mfa the consent of Buyer (and Lender if applicable), escrow an amount at Settlement to provide for the same.
The Jaikwe to conduct a walk-through inspection, or to claim that an item is not as represented, shall not constitute a
waiver by Buyer of the right io receive, on the date of possessicHri, the items as represented,
12. CHANGE pyfitIG TRANSACTION- Seller ^ B e s that from the date erf Acraptance unfii the da^ of Closing, none
of the following shall occur without the prior written consent of Buyer (a) no changes in any existing leases shall be made;
(b) no new leases shafl be entered into; (c) no substantial alterations or improvements to the Property shall be mate or
undertaken; and (d) no further financial encumbrances to the Property shall be made.
13. AUTHORITY OF SJGNEftSL If Buyer or Seiter is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, limited liability company, or
other entity, the person executing this Contract on Its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer and
Seller
14* CGSPUEIE CONTHACT. This Contract together with its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures,
constitutes the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations,
reoreseniations, warranties, understandings or contracts between the parties. This Contract cannot be changed except by
written agreement of the parties.
15. DEPUTE fl^OLUTJON. The parties agree that any dispute, arising prior to or after Closing, related to this Contract
(check Applicable box)
MSHALL
tXj MAY AT THE OPTION OF THE PARTIES
ikst be submitted to mecfettion. if the parties agree to mediation, the dispute sh^t be submitted to mediation through a
meciafejn provider mutually agreed upon by the parties. Each party agrees to bear its own costs of mecfiafion. If
mediation fails, the other procedures end remedies available under this Contract shall apply. Nothing in this Section 15
sh^H prohibit any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation.
16. OBFAULT, If Buyer defeats, Seller rnssf eteetei&er to retain the Earned Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or to
reiumttandsueBuy^tospiectf^
If Seller defaults, in
addffion to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect either to accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest
Money Deposit as liquidated damages* or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies
Pago 4 o f « pages

Seflerti Initiate\ A;

Date i;

*

: 7

Buyer's fnitiala

<)•/*»

Date

1^~°

t

Q

0<r

avatable aa law. If Buyer elects to accept lkyidated damages. Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon
demand. H is agmed that denial of a Loan Appfccafton made by the Buyer is not a default and is governed by Section
£3(b).
17.ATTO8ieYFGSSANDC0STre. to the even* of JSfeg^kxi or binding artxtrafcxi to enforce this
party shall be errthled to co<* and n ^ ^
However, attorney fees shall not be ^farcied for participation
in mecfcstion under Section 15,
1& NOTICES. Except as provided in Section 23, all notices required under this Contract must be: (a) in writing; (b)
&gnaci by t i e party glaringratface;and (c) receivedfaythe other party or the other party's agent no lalar than the applicable
date referenced in this Contract
1& ABROGATION, Except for the provisions of Sectkxrte t < U , 10-2, 15 and 17 and exptess warranties made in flics
Contract, the provisions of thisContn^^^^Jnma|^aR^aassnQ.
20. ISSK OF LOSS. AW risk of loss to toe Property, inciudsng physical damme Of destruction to the Property or its
improvements due to any cause except ordinary wear and tea' and loss caused by a taking m eminent domain, shall be
borne by Seller until the transaction i$ closed.
2 1 - T l i e © Q F T i « E f f i Q * G E . Tfcneisof the essence nBg^rc^ the d a t e set f ^
screed to in wftsng by al! parses. Unless otherwisefcxpSditystaled in this Contract: (a) performance under each S&ction
<K this Contract wtecbreferences& date steal absolutely be required by £ 0 0 PU Mountain Time on the stated date; and (b)
the term "days' steH mean calendar days and shaft be counted b e ^ k H ^ OT the d ^ tr^c^ng the event which triggers the
timing raquitemera (LeM Acceptance, Notice of Loan Dentai, etc.). Performance dates and times referenced herein shall
not be binifing upon Me companies,tenders,appraisers and others not parties to this Contract, except as otherwise agreed
to in writing by such non-party.
22- FAX TRANSJftSSiON Alffi COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile <fex) transmission of asigned copy of this Contract, any
addenda and counteroffers, and theretransmissionof any signed fax shall be the same as delivery of an original. This
Contract and any addenda and counteroffers may be executed in counterparts.
23, AGCS'TANCE. "Acceptance" occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other (a)
signs the offer or counteroffer ^her© ootod to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicaies to tm other party or to the other
party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required
24. COHTRACT DEADLINES. Buyer and Sa&ar agree that 1km following deadfinm shall appiy to this Contract:
{a) Loan Application * Fee Deadline

September 6, 2004

(Dare)

(b) Sefier Dlsciosam Ctoadhne

September 13.2004

. (Date)

(c) Evaluations & Inspections Deadline

c^^r^ra?Q4^

. (Date)

(d) Lo*m Denial Deadline

September 30. 2004

.(Date)

(e) Appraisal Dcwdlins

September 30, 20Q4_

.(Date)

(f) Setttaroent Deadline

October 29, 2004

. (Date),

a . OFFS1 AND TttlE FOR ACCB^ANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the Property on the above terms and concftions. If
Seller does notaccept this offer by: 5 3 Q _ f ] AM TX| P i l Mountain Time on Seatember'fr 2004
(Date),
tjss-off«r!shall lapse; and toe Brokerage shall rsiimttte Earnest Money Deposit to Buyer,
(Buyer's Signature)

ra

"

(Offer Date)

^

(Buyer's ^fam)

(Offer Date)

Ttm taw ottlMittMvaOttar OMMsftafl boretenmtfto * * tt« "OMw Rafwroca Date"

Doug and. Drea MarKham
(Buyers'Names) (PLEASE PRINT)

Page5of6pagw

(Notice Address)

i

Seller's i n i t i a t e j

, Data_

(Phone)

(Zip Coda)

Buyer's Initiate ^

^

Date ^ H

~° H

?o^
ACCBPTAW^rtXHiNTEROFFERmEJECTTON

CHECK ONE:

[ ] ACCEPTANCE OF OFFEtt TO PURCHASE: Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the tem^ arKl conditicm specified
above.
[ ] COUNTEROFFER: Seller presents for Buyers Acceptance the terms of Buyer's offer subject to the exceptions or
V motfiftcatfons as specified in the attached ADDENDUM NO.
.
.^3-o<
(Date) (Time)

{S^^r^OOBttute)
(Sellers'Names) (PLEASE PRttfT)

(Skier's Signature)
(No^ce Address)

(Date) (Time)
(Zip Code)

(Phone)

I 1 REJECTION: Seller Rejects the foregoing offer.
(Seller's Signature)

(Date) (Time)

(Seller's Signature)

(Date) (Time)

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
State law requires Broker to fumfeh Buyer and Seller wth copies of this Contract bearing all signatures, (fill in applicable
section below,)
A,l

ledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Coptract bearing all signatures:

jppM*,^
(Buyer's Signature)

(Date)

'(Buyers Sioflatufe)
Drea Marknam

(Date)

(Date)

(Seller's Signature)

(Date)

DougMarkham
(Sellers Signature)

B. J pe*3C*iaHy caused a final copy of the*
deOueredon
Sent/Deliveied by (specify),

Contract baring all signatures to be { ] faxed [ ] mailed I J hand
, postage prepaid, to the [ 1 Seller [ I Buyer

7 1 « TOfW APPROVED BY Tlffi UT>« REAL EOT^^
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Seller's Initiate

2 S<

Buyer's initials^

Data.
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SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM
TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
THiSSELLEH HKANCING AQOOIDUtltemade a part of that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with
an Q 8 ^ Reference Date of August 3 1 . 2 0 0 4
.between Doug and Drea Markham
as Buyer, md . lay and Qfflrhy Rmrttey
as Seller, regarding
the Ptoperty located at 979 Oarnmftrnn Vaftey Drive
. The terms ofthts ADDENDUM are
hereby tncxxporaied as part of the REPC.
1. CREDIT DOCUIIOflnS- Seller'sextension!ctf onecfittoBuyershaflbeevidercedby: Ex]Note«*KfDeed ofInsst
I ] Note and A I H m ^ u s t v e D ^ of Trust [ IQtften
2. CEHBJnrTEBlES- IT^etenrooftheaecBlttoc^
$285000
pnTO^arflouitfoftte
$939ftf&
oarmnqffr
. llieefrtro unpaid balance of o r i ^ ^
months
ftomdafeoftheNofee. F k ^ pavrrwit due D e c f y n l w l *04 , Add^onal principal foments, bafioon payments or other
temis asfoaows: &100 onn Hii** on rteramfter 1 f 2 0 0 5 after haltoon payment, monthly payment will be

redtimrftQtl SH.fiO
TTiecirei^^
Q^P9^ to provide loE3tiyor at Settiemont: (a) an amortization schedule based on the above terms; (b) a written disdosure
of the total interest Buyer w$ pay to maturity of tfte Note; and (c) the annual percentage rate on the Note based on Joan
closing costs.
S. TAXES AT® JtSSESSJffSTSL In aricfiaon to ft® payments referenced in Section 2 stove. Buyer shall also be
raspons&fe Ion (a) propertytaxes;(b) homeowners association dues; (c) special assessments; and (d) hazard insurance
premiums OT the Property. These ob%Btions wfil be pakl: £ ] directty to SelJer/ejcrow Agent on a monthly basis [x
Idlroc^faiheapp&katbte&w^^
4. PAYIIENT* B * J ^ S payments under Sections £ and 3 abov^
[X] Salter I ] an Escrow Agent if an
Esoow Agent
^actasEsciowAgentandwfflbefBspo
on any underlying mortgage or deed of tost (file ^j^derfyingmoilgage^
Cost of setting up the escrow
accountshalfbepaMby: f I Buyer! 1 Safer f ] spBt e w t t y betwean the partta*.
5. L A T E P A l ^ l ^ J f r / B ^ P A Y l O r f , Any paymsrenotmade within J * ^ ^
of $25
or
%of.the instalment due, whichever is {peater. Amounts in defauitshafl bear interest at a rate
ofS.fi
% per annum. A8 or part erf ^ p r i a c ^ balance on tb^
6w DUEOW-3ALE. As pari erf the Safer OisdQst#^
Copy ctf the underlying nu>i^^
Buyer's obligation to purchase
UITK^ttiisCort^ar te <xindMjon^
in accordant with Section 8
ofihe REPC. U she holder of the underiying ravage cafetfie Joan <*je as a result (^ttwstransacfton, Buyer a^ees to
discharge the underiying Joan as mqufred by the mortgage lender. In such event, Seller's remaining equity shail be paid as
provided in the credit documents,
7. BUYER DISCLOSURES. Buyer has provided to Seller, as a nequtod part of this ADDBNIDUM, the attached Buyer
Rnanciailnfonnafjon Sheet Buyerm^ use tfos Buyer Finance fa to
swd the Attorney Generafs Office, or may provide comparable written information in a differentformat,togetherwith euch
addifcnal informal^ a
Buyer I 1 WILLI x l WILL NOT provide Seller withogges-of1jBiT>
'-tfjfijiraSKrthetwop^
that Seller may contact Suyer&cunent^^
^emftfeytraOTf^
in the 8uyer Financial Information Sheet
a ^LLH* APf^VAiCj^gSei^
loSstokjtjiiy^^
credit r e p o i t a ^ f l S f H ' ^
worthiness of Buyer,

Pagelof2pao«9

Seller'sloltia&iJ'^

in Section 24(b) of the REPC, Buye^shall-prowde^
a consumer credit reporting ageoey_3efemay_i#e the
to evaluate thecredit-

Pats?

f<;

\'

Buyer's Initiate

\ W ^

Date„y

^ ^

;805 SS7H05&3
PROM ~ fincirrea Gasporra* DBS
09/^3/2804 17:35
M356S24&' 2fl

•is -aeQepti&fo if ^ c a m e m ^ ^ * ^ f r

ra^

«S-ttEK}3» © r f i y f t W ^
ma&ttoBn^
Dapaafc

&os*»«w Period
Eaneft Alotwy

-«S JWiurolo Objact 9 F a s a l t e * « ^ ^ ^

a Buyer

amount <if «to xxSdbtap^ie9$ «D !$» Setter. « * £ & * paytorsu* p c ^ - t f ^ t a w « -

^c©i*MidK^^
4aad3kd%^^

not
L i §AM{XJPM

aass&a^

«3apiea *ie oBer as art forth in f t e SELLER BNANCJNG
•frfirl.

.

:

Social -Security- Number

/?

Soc^S^sj^&ui^

{Date) flirm)

f ]&**"[ 1

v

| R&ECJlOlfc I £8atfer| lAqpw^^ClBa^4ofiBO0^3&i^aMANC{MGAI»ENDUM.

ISgA&uty

Peg* 2 of 2 page*

*Da*fc) (Time)

^Owr^lalfWs

{8ifnature)

(Date) (now)

Gala

1*f l(
a.1 Seller Review. % the B>afejef^ & Inspe^
revww ttecredk report and tf»B
is acceptable. If the cortettofthecrocitreports
eifhar^ajprovikie^
REPC by providing written notice to Buyer by the Evaluations & inspections DeadSne referenced in Section 24(c) of the
REPC The Brokerage, upon roctipt dt 3 copy of §eSer"s wrigen norjce of ^TgaJfeSgn, ^ M r$|yrn $p 8yy$r th$ Earnest
Money Deposit
8*2 Salter Objections. If Seter does not knmedi&efy cancel the RH*C as provided above, Sefler may, by toe
Eva&iarjons& Inspectors
Buyer
aiKfS€fesriafi haw seven calendar d
in writing upon ihe manner of resolving Baler's c*|edkxis- Buyer may, but stafl not be required to, resolve Seller's
cfc^ectjons. tf Seller and Buj^hsi^nofcagreed^OT
flie RH*Cfay provkfing written nofce ID Buyer no feferthan time calendar days after exptaaSon of the Response Period.
The Brokerage, upon receipt of a copy of Senary written notice of canceHation, shaH return to Buyer the Earnest Money
Deposit.
-&3 Failure to Object ffSeSer does notdeisver a wra^en objection to Buyer regewfeig tte cracferepeator a Buyer
Ofectosure by the Evaluation* & Inspecfions Deadline referenced in Section 24(c) of the REPC or cancel tfie REPC as
prowted in Sections &l or8.2 of f}jss ADDB4DI&}. the credft report and Buyer Disclosures **& be deemed approved by
Setter.
9. TITLE INSURANCE. Buyer! JSHALLI ISHALLNOT provide
toSmm-almid^spc^^mBhmBmv^'m^e
amount of the indebtedness to the SeSer; ami sfiaffpc^lbrajcbpofic^atSdateni^jL
1€L DtSCLQSarffiQFTAXSDHBfl^^
By no later than Sefltenient, Buyer and Setter shall disclose
toeachoftieriheirresf^^
ivitti federal laws on r^x»tlng jmxigagefir^re^fofiSngs^fththe Internal Revenue Service.
Toibespclenttrieterm^^
arricouniBr©fiBra,tJie^^
AfiothertenraoftheREr^indtf
«KxJ^bym
1 Buyer shafl have until 5 : 0 0
f 1AM[X]PM
*tounia*> Time cm September ± 2 0 0 4
{Date), to accept ihe terms of this SBJLER FINANCING ADDENDUM in
accordance with Section 23 of trie REPC. Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this SELLER FINANCING
ADDENDUM shall lapse.
[ ]Buyer[ J Seller Signature

(Date) (Time)

_
V'-,.^. -<^>[ ] Buyer j^J Setfe^^nater^ ^=^-^>-

(Date) (Time)

~

Social Security Number
.
Social Security Number

CHECK ONE:
[ ] ACCEPTANCE: [ J Sailor [ J Buyer hereby accepts these terms.
f/\J

COUNTEROFFER: I ISeJterf 1 Buyar presents as a counteroffer the terms setforthon the attached ADDENDUM
NO.

T T S & A . ^—
— ^~ T(Date)^(Time)
-^^

(Signature)
I

(Signature)

(Data) (Time)

I REJECTION: [ ISW!*r[ ] Buyer rejects theforegoingSELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM.

(Signature)

(Date) (Time)

(Signature)

(Date) fllme)

TIOT R » W JM^HOVI^ W THEUTAH ffiiU. ESTATC

Pflge2of2peges

Se<lert InitiatejiM

Dota^^L^;Buyer's ltifttete_ fi -/"?, ,«

am

1 ^ ^<(

/U ^ \(
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ADDENDUM NO. 1
TO
REAL ESTATE HJfiCHASE COHTRACT
TI*SISAHtX]A0peffiUli I ] COtfKTEfiOmSR *o Hiat REAL STATE P U R 0 4 / ^ CONTIWH* (the TB^C-) with
an Offer Reference Date of Ancmst 3 1 , 2004
, indudng alS prior addenda and counteroffers, between
Doro and ftran Hnrkfa^aa
as 8wer. and J»v and Parley Bradley
as Seller,
reoaftfingthe Property located at973 Paggjeron v a l l e y Drive
. The
f&towingtermsare hereby aK»n»rasB8d as part of the REPC:
1) S e l l e r a g r e e s to complete c o n s t r u c t i o n o f home,
2 ) Bgyetr ajad S e l l e x t o l ± « t e x p e c t a t i o n s o f complf^tirm upon negcfc t r i p t o S t . George
i n mid Septeaafoer*
L_
3)

p^x

F a n i x t a r e t o h& jjuclTtded-

{ s e l l e r t o a t t a c h l i s t of included Items)

BUYER AHQ SELLER AGREE THAT THE C»NniACT DEAIMJNES f
(C*fa^APPUCttBt£8<^

^ ^ o the extents ienns<#tfissA£^
sfi aid counteroffers, these fenns shall control. Afi otfiertermsof the REPC. including all prior adderKte and counteroffers,
°HVBhfiQ[ffig^^
IBfeF^rsl^l^^ur« i ^iOO_[ JAMIXJPM
Mourrtalrni^^
31 J 2004
fDate). to &M&& theternisof this ADOBMDUM in accordance with Ihe
ofSec^onaSoftheRS^C. Unless so accepted, Ute offer as set forth In this ADDBIDUM shall lapse.

_. ,

_-

—

JXJ BuywViaeMer^nSJre

*?-)—^
(Dale)

(Time)

[ ] Buyer [ ] Seller Signature

(Date)

fTime)

ACCEPTANCE/COUNrefK)^^
CHECK ONE:
I I ACCEPTANCE: I JSolter[ ]Buyor hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM.
lyi COUffIERQR=ER: [ ] Safer { J&iy^presenteasacaunteroff^tfietennsof attached AODENDUM NO.
(Signatu^^

^^>T"

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Date)

(Time)

[ 1 ffiJECTIOK: I iSea^rJ ] Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM.
(Signature)

(Date)

(Tune)

(Sign^a)

7 m FOTH AFFROTSD BY T ^
BT&ZTtiTE AUGUST & 2003. rTflBalAOe»AlfflStJPeia0«£MJLPREVlOUe5LY APPROVED VBISIONSOFTfflSPOftll.
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ADDENDUM NKX 3
ID
Rf-AL ESTATE PURCHASE COWTHACT
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TOTAL HEALTH CARE PARTNERS, INC,
*
A
J

800-891-5165
3835-R THOUSAND OAKS BLVD., #130
WESTUKE VILLAGE, CA 91362-3837

90-373O/1222

DATE.
i\ PAY
,j
4

^g^-rug^
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ADDENDUM 2

ADDENDUM 3

Red Desert Realty, LC
140 North Tuacahn Dr. #49
lvins, Utah 84738

The undenrigned Buyers and SeUerswto
dated August 31,2004relativetothe property as : 979 Damraeron Valley Dr,
Hereby declare said agreement to be null and void by leason of:" Buyers failure to
provide the seller with a F ^
deadline stated in Section 8 of the Sellers Financing Addendum that refers to the
date in die Real Estate Purchase Contract in section 24^b) Contract Deadlines.
Seller has elected to caned this Contract at this time."
And mutually release the partiesfromany ainrfaUobUgations there under whhiK)fiir^
due force or effect To said parties.
Deposits in the amount of $ 10,000,00 are being held by Century 21 At The ftocldcs/
StGcorge,in a non-interest bearing trust account (>otury21 AtTheRodaes/StGeoree
is hereby authorized and directed to promptly disburse said deposits in the following
manner:^ 10,000.00 to Doug and Andrea Markham
-sa*~*rr-

Purchaser

Dale

Purchaser

Date

Purchasers Real Estate Agent
Disbursement made this
Check#

By:

day of

,2004

ADDENDUM 4

£/m£U:TT
At The Rockies
665 E. St George Blvd
St George, Utah 84770
Business (435) 673-9090
Fax (435) 628-1997
Toll Free (800) 826-0354

Attention: Jay and Darby Bradley,
September 24, 2004
As per your cancel latkm of the Real Estate Contract dated August 31,2004 rd ative to the
property located at 979 Dammeron Valley Dr., the buyers, the Markham't, are going
forward with the contract The $10,000 earnest monies you required are still held in the
Century 21 trust account Included is a copy of their credfareportand financial
statements for your review. Ifyou choose not to accept seller financing, the Markhara's
have in place financing with Country Wide Mortgage for the purchase price of this
property.
As discussed on the 12 of September 2004, when the buyer bad flown in from California
to go over thesereferenceditems,financial$ (item S seller financing addendum), list of
expected con^edon (item 2 addendum IX fi^^
both buyer and seller agreed to go over these at a later date, as this time was not good for
you, the sella".
The Markhara's are goingforwardwith this contract We would like to exercise Real
Estate Purchase Contract line item 15 on or before September 30,2004. We require a
written response by 5;00pm September 25, 2004.

iJj^i^C^
Carolyn Norton
Agent
Century 21 At The Rockies

Each Office Is IndeoendenUv Owned And Ooerated

MARK - 000029

ADDENDUM 5

ADDENDUM 6

ADDENDUM 7

//

^N\

At The Rockies
665 E. St. Georga Blvd
St. George, Utah 84770
Business (435) 673-9090
Fax (435) 628-1997
Toll Free (800) 828-0354

Jay and Darby Bradley,
September 27, 2004
Jay, I did receive your phone call today, I was showing property in outlying areas and my
cell service was sketchy A best. We have only Darby's cell phone number, which goes
straight to voice mail We sent a package to bar office, which the saver said was
undeliverable. Today I sent a package certified mail to her office it is the only address
we have for her.
By Friday October 1f 2004, the Markhamf s, want a date set for mediation so they can
schedule the time to come out hereforthe mediation Their intent is to still close on this
property, if we can not mediate, they will sue for specific performance. Their attoroey
stated that they will file a l i s Pendens and will sue for fraud and punhive damages.
I believe that mediation is in everyone's best interest, please call so we can arrange a
time. You can reach me at 435-467-5454, my partner Stewart Shuraway at 435-6324064.

Carolyn Norton
Agent
Century 21 At The Rockies

ERch OfficQ is independently Owned And Operated

r\ r\ r\<-* ^

ADDENDUM 8

d\.

&+$C&<2<

/I

^ K \

S

At The Rockies
665 E. St. George Blvd
St. George, Utah 84770
Business (435) 673-9090
Fax (435) 628-1997
Toll Free (600) 828-0354

9-30-04
Jay Bradley,
To memorialize our oQnversatfon from today, 9-30-04 at approximately 9:30 am, you are
refusing mediation and do not intend to go fbrwaixl with the contraaforthe purchase of
the property at 979 Dammeron Vail ey Dr. We are to contact your attorney Robert
Jensen with any further communication.
The buyers are notifying you that any c o n b ^
The attorneys will communicate from this point forward.
Carolyn Norton

A
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Each Office Is independently Owned And Operated

ADDENDUM 9

CeJl(435) 632-4064
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At The Rockies
665 E St. Qeorg&'BlvcL.
St. George, UT 84770
(435)673-9090
-(800)828-0354
Tw
(435)628-1997
DATE:

I-SO-OH

FAX NUMBER:
TO: J c W
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COMPANY
FROM:

CfirolyA

/vJgCTar\

PAGES (INC. COVER):

V

SUBJECT:

.££_.. Kabert > W g<fn / £ 7*/ -70CV„

If you have any questions, or did not receive ail of the pages, please call (435) 673-9090
The materials contained in this facsimile transmission are private and confidential and are the property of the
sender. The information contained in the material is privileged and is intended only for the use of the
individual(s) named above. If you have received this facsimile in error, please Immediately notify us by
telephone to arrange for return of the forwarded documents to us. Thank vou!
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HOME LOANS

E a s y . Really."

6400 Legacy Dr., FIX 255
Piano, TX 75024

TO: Doug Maikham

DATE: 9/30/04

FAX: 805-557-0503
PHONE:
FROM:
PHONE:
FAX:

# Pages Including Cover: 3
Steve Prescott
866-800-3222, XJ392
888-854-0647

Congratulations!!
Thank yon far allowing Cbimteywide the opportunity to do your official
mortgage pr^quali5c«tiorL Hease present this letter to Keatara dining your
buyxng/krikingproc^ Kymhavequestkinsarneedl^^
Again, thank you for applying with Cocmtrywide Home bans and happy
Iiooaehtintingl
Sincerely,

Steve Rresoott
Interstate Lending Gtoitp
S68~SO0-S222xlS92

Ifyuuhitvereotwedthie^trarism^
5^rt?OBiNnngfeKtranemi85k^
Countrywide Home lotm at 1-S0044W048 extetsfoti 2288
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Countrywide*
HOME LOANS
Stpt*nb«r30,;toa4

DoupMarUmm
2231 fcrfmscottCt

Cteer Doug Martham:
Cwflfatulaltorttl TheeiHdos^ccitfBe^alfldftayra^
You^nowamonqa^tcSsnovpofipn^b^
th« horn*buy^gprocesseaiyand3rfbTTl*W5. Forf*cr30ytftrs, Cotmiiywfde hatb«ma teadartnd
ki F F « O § Iwrre o*JnonsWp portofetarmort people

c*rtJtart*kib*nd. U^-frt^ pm^u&tfioatioii 1 h ^
thf home sate process wifeufr «nti ««iy, * i * t g you both * m and money.
If you nt&H any assistance or have any quoafatts, ptaote fesl fN*tocalrr«at(flG5}aoo42Q,w.i3$2*

•nPowcott
Home Low Conctdtanf, Interstate Landing
(9^)600-3222 i x t l 3 t e
(WM&SM-OWFox
$lfrph3f!jnFEKuttf%wunliywod€XOffi
* T n t a r e » « # g t g & ^ c « t i I i c ^ f o r d ^ ^ Appro^ is »/bjert to g^frcjory f»^wofpr»pi<ty.1|nwftqiar
<fe)QUU lOU&l* (JMOjJWW f&qacffixnftftiS find VftffflCStiOfl or fHKHWlfllKHI pnjvktad b y bairo%C4'_
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Countrywide'
H O M E

Issued

to:

LaAfts

DomUaricham
2231KefMcoftCt

fcfcoMrar^pteasurttof^akxgtow^
Purchase Pwen
$ 550,000,00
is* Mortgage Loan Amount
X 440,OW.00
SccOtV^HfW«HiQljc»nAfTHJU^
4? 3^000100
Dow* Paytoenr
$ 55100000
RwncoTYpe:
PayopfonARM
Loaa Program:
0
Intern* Rate MPRT
f.7»*
1772 %
Otitfrt^fU&XttFitt:
0.000%
&00PK
Twine
500 Months
Ooaupancy/PtopeftyTypo*
arK/fana «^R .
Dofeoftesue-.
OT02OO4

Now you can shopfeyyour again home wim wore ^
toara, w#-^youcM-prornii^torrate

Aanwoyiiaadtodon:and kmw*w& in home

t CmistiStartt, (ntentsts Lerufing
(90^0004222 x1$K
(8S^«54-0S47^c
• Secom^RnwKfogtoOTttetaitea^
*• APR (a a* estimate and may be nwro or less wfth any d)8fig(»M loan a n w ^ down pt^mettwo^
tofm* Arty ra^ircfftaa* may kM^ your approved IOM

r - f V r t E ; i_v^«-%>-w

t^sss^r "Hv>

Easy. Really."
6400 Legacy Dr., PTX 255
Piano, TX 75024

TO: Doug Markhain

DATE: 9/30/04

FAX: 805-557-0503
# Pages Including Cover: 3

PHONE:
FROM:
PHONE:
FAX:

Steve Prescott
866-8003222, x.1392
888-854-0647

Congratulations!!
Thank you for allowing Countrywide the opportunity to do your official
mortgage prequalification. Please present this letter to Kealtors during your
buying/looking process. If you have questions or need help please call me.
Again, thank you for applying with Countrywide Home loans and happy
house hunting!
Sincerely,

Steve Prescott
Interstate Lending Group
866-800-3222x1392

If you havereceivedthis fax transmission in error, or if you would otherwise prefer to
stopreceivingfax transmissionsrelatedto your home loan application, please call
Countrywide Home Loans at 1-800-449-4049 extension 2288

MARK - 00030

Countrywide
HOME LOANS
7l09(bp38(4DMI
ftroTbas7SCE4

September 30,2004

Doug Markham
2231 KelmscottCt
Westlake Village, CA 91361

Dear Doug Markham:
Congratulations! The enclosed certificate officially names you as a Pre-Qualified CountrywWe Home Buyer*.
You ere now among a select group of smart buyers who have chosen Countrywide Homo Loans to make
the home buying process easy and affordable. For over 30 years, Countrywide has been a leader and an innovator
m making home ownership possiWe for more peop*e.
You are afl set to negotiate with the home seller from a position of strength and control with the enclosed
certificate In hand. Up-front pre-quaffficatfon from a major lender puts you in the best possible position to complete
the home sale process quickly and easily, saving you both time and money.
If you need any assistance or have any questions, please teal free to call me at (866) 800-3222. exL 1302,
Sirto^ry,

f>hen Poescott
Home Loan Consultant, Interstate Lending
(866) 800-3222 ext 1382
(888) 854-0647 Fox
stephenjrescott@countrywide.com
•Please see enclosed certificate for detafls. Approval is subject to satisfactory review of property, financial
documents, program requirements and verification of imormirtion provided by borrower.

|LPJ[

£ f v * Ms«Mlrtf U*Uf

0 1 M f OHintywtfe H o * * l u m . Inc. Tnw*r **vte» * m « * turnfl,*property of
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MARK-00031

Counttywide
HOM E

LOANS

Certificate Number 2086361296
Issued to:

Doug Markham
2231 Keftmscott Ct
Westlake Village, CA 91361

It la our great pleasure to pass along the news that you are approved* for a Countrywide Home Loan.
Purchase Power
1st Mortgage Loan Amount
Secondary Financing Loan Amount*:
Down Payment:
Finance Type:
Loan Program;
Interest Rate /APR":

Origination / Discount Points:
Term:
Occupancy / Property Type:
Date of Issue:

$ 580,000.00
S 440,000.00
S
55,000.00
$
55,000.00
Pay option ARM
0
1.750%
1.772%
0.000%
0.000%
360 Moms
2nd harm SFR

modern

* Please note that satisfactory review of property, financial documents, and program requirements
are needed to issue fmailoan approva/.
Congratulations!!
Now you can shop for your dream home with more confidence. A$ recognized leaders and Innovators in home
loans, nyrfpve you our promise to make doing business with us as easy and affordable as possible.

^tephenJ

Home fcwh Consultant, Interstate Lending
(866)800-3222 x 1392
(888)854-0647 Fax
Stephenj)rescott@countrywide.com
* Secondary Financing loan details are not represented.
** APR Is an estimate and may be more or less with any changes in loan amount down payment or other
terms. Any rate Increase may lower your approved loan amount
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1240 East 100South.Suite 9

I enJons J ensen
& Bayles, LLP

J

st. &*&, m 84?$>o

y

Tcl(435) 674-9718
Fax f435) 674-9006

Attorney*
Attaracn & Counselor* *t Law
Bruce C. JJenkins, P.C
Robert M. Jensen, P.C
Thomas J. Bayles, F.C

tycritons@iJbliw.net
rjcnaengftjblaw net
tbaylK@iJbUw net

October 4, 2004
HAND DELIVERY
VIA FACSIMILE. 435-628-1997
and US MAIL
CENTURY 21 AT THE ROCKIES
Attn: Carolyn Norton
665 E. St George Blvd.
St George, UT 84770
Re:

NOTICE OF CANCELLATION
REPC dated 9-1-04
Buyer - Doug and Drea Markham
Seller - Jay and Darby Bradley

Dear Ms. Norton:
This letter is written to reconfirm the Cancellation Notice delivered by Sellers to yon on
September 20, 2004. That initial Notice of Cancellation is based upon the partes' "Seller and
Financing Addendum," paragraph 8, which requires: "By the Seller DisclosureDeadlme, referenced
in Section 24(b) of the REPC, Buyer shall provide to Seller at Buyer's expense, a current credit
report on Buyer from a Consumer Credit Reporting Agency,* This requirement corresponds with
the obligations and responsibilities imposed by the "Evaluation and Inspection** deadlines set forth
in paragraph 8 of the REPC. Based upon that September 20, 2004 Notice of Cancellation from
Seller, without more, this REPC is properly cancelled.
Additional Notice of Cancellation is hereby given to the Buyer, pursuant to the "Seller
Financing Addendum,*" paragraph 8.1(b) which provides "by the Evaluation and Inspection's
deadline referenced m Section 24(c) of the REPC, Seller shall review the credit report and the Buyer
Disclosures to determine if the content of the Credit Report and the Buyer Disclosures is acceptable.
If the content of the Credit Report or the Buyer Disclosures is not acceptable to Seller, Seller may
elect to...(b) immediately cancel tbcREPC by providing written notice to Buyer by the evaluations
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CENTURY 21 AT THE ROCKIES
Attn: Carolyn Norton
October 4,2004
Page 2
and inspection deadline referenced in Section 24(c) of the REPC." Notice is hereby given, that
Sellers do hereby immediately cancel the REPC based cm the content of the Credit Report and the
Buyer Disclosures. Specifically, these documents are poor jfax copies, are sloppy and in many
instances are illegible, the attached schedules arc not completed with detailed information requested
.in. the forms; Sellers are concerned with the admission of bankruptcy or judgment; Sellers are
concerned with the sheer length, of the Consumer Credit Report, as well as the fact that the package
was out of order, appears to be presented with missing pages and potential amounts of the report
being cut off or improperly copied
Thefinancialinformation was received on September 27,2004, and the remaining portions
ofBuyers Disclosures weir not received until September 30r 2004, being a substantial period oftime
after such documents were due and in a contract wherein time was of the essence.
Accordingly, this REPC was first cancelled for untimely disclosure, and separately cancelled
for rejection of the content of the disclosures, subsequently and untimely received.
Sincerely.
JENKINS, JENSEN & BAYLES, LLP

RMJ/rc
cc: Jay and Darby Bradley

JB.l JtrCattltry21 ,?-30-^C^7»d

